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Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage 
EREZ ALONI* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Scholars who have examined the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in 
European countries have concluded that the path to the legalization of same-sex 
marriage follows an incremental process involving specific stages.  They suggest that it 
is possible to predict, based on certain visible social and legal processes or assessable 
parameters, which U.S. states will be the next to recognize same-sex marriage.  These 
scholars argue that such small cumulative legal changes at the state level constitute the 
best means of legalizing same-sex marriage in the United States, and that civil unions 
are a necessary step in this process.  This article shows that predictions based on these 
theories have not been accurate and that attempts to generalize the experience of 
legalizing same-sex marriage overlook a variety of often significant and sometimes subtle 
social, political, and legal differences between the United States and Europe.  Therefore, 
these theories cannot sufficiently explain how social change happens and cannot be used 
to formulate strategic plans for legalizing same-sex marriage in the United States.  This 
article also proposes that the adoption of civil unions can significantly delay legal 
acceptance of same-sex marriage.  It suggests that the theories overlooked the fact that in 
some European countries, lesbian and gay organizations were more interested in 
securing partnership rights for same-sex couples, rather than marriage itself.  This path 
is the one that advocates in the United States should take. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American scholars often look to the experiences of European states’ 
adoption of laws permitting same-sex marriage to lend credibility to their 
recommendations for optimal political and social change strategies.  Some of 
these scholars have concluded that the legalization of same-sex marriage follows 
an incremental legal progression through specific stages.  They suggest that it is 
possible to predict, based on certain visible social and legal processes or 
assessable parameters, which state will be the next to recognize same-sex 
marriage.  Within this incrementalist paradigm, they view civil unions as a 
necessary step prior to the complete legalization of same-sex marriage.  These 
scholars argue that small cumulative legal changes at the state level constitute 
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the best means of bringing about the legalization of same-sex marriage in the 
United States. 
It is undoubtedly true that the European experience with the legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships enables understanding of the way in which 
social and legal changes occur and provide insight into future changes.  Yet 
predictions based on the proposed theories concerning the path leading to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage have been disproved and have shown that the 
application of a general rule falls flat in a cascade of exceptions.  An overview of 
unfolding events on both continents casts more than a little doubt on the 
accepted theory of incrementalism.  In this Article, I argue that the attempt to 
describe the experience of legalizing same-sex marriage in terms of one 
overarching, globally shared process overlooks a variety of significant and 
sometimes subtle social, political, and legal differences between the United 
States and Europe.  To this end, there is always going to be what I call a butterfly 
effect—small variations of the initial condition of a dynamic system that may 
produce large variations in the long-term behavior of the system.  In this case, 
unpredictable factors can influence the debate among (as well as strategies used 
and actions taken by) policy makers and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)1 
activists in pursuit of the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
 
 1. I use the term LGB to describe members who self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual.  In 
doing so, I do not intend to erase or obscure other identities.  I also frequently make reference to the 
LGB “community,” a term that is a theoretical concept much more than it is a reality.  This does not 
mean that a monolithic community of LGB individuals exists in any meaningful way.  At times, the 
multitude of interests within this community converge; at other times, they diverge significantly.  
Acknowledging this to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout this Article, 
and I attempt to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most likely to 
diverge, particularly vis-à-vis marriage.  This article does not refer specifically to transgender 
marriage because this raises questions concerning a state’s definition of male and female.  For some 
transgender individuals, the option to marry already exists, even in states that do not recognize 
same-sex marriage.  This is not to say that transgender people do not have an interest in same-sex 
marriage, just that the rules for determining sex of a person are different from state to state and thus 
involve different sets of legal rules.  See generally Julia A. Greenberg, The Road Less Traveled: The 
Problem with Binary Sex Categories 51-73, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); 
Gwen Cooper, Transgender Marriage, ETRANSGENDER (Feb. 24, 2006), http://etransgender.com/ 
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=74. 
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The most accepted and widely cited2 theory of the path to the legalization 
of same-sex marriage is that of Kees Waaldijk,3 which has been embraced and 
advanced most notably by William N. Eskridge4 and Yuval Merin.5  They call 
this theory the “law of small change,” the “step-by-step” approach, and the 
“necessary process,” respectively.  For the purposes of this Article, I refer to all 
three designations jointly as “the theory of small change” or “incrementalism.”  
Generally speaking, these scholars suggest that every country or state will, on its 
path to the legalization of same-sex marriage, follow the same three-stage 
process.  In their model, change is initiated with the repeal of sodomy laws, 
followed by the enactment of antidiscrimination laws protecting LGB people, 
and then, if all goes as expected, this process culminates in the eventual 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  In Europe, this course has often been 
followed by the equalization of parental rights.  Extrapolating from the 
European experience, these scholars have arrived at a number of conclusions. 
First, they suggest that it is possible to predict when the legalization of 
same-sex marriage will be achieved based on the stage a state is currently in. 6  
Second, they assert that the enactment of civil unions into law expedites the 
legalization of same-sex marriage by leading to the next step in the process and 
is desirable because it can show the public that their fears about same-sex 
partnership and its potential negative effects on society are groundless.  Finally, 
these scholars assert that the fight for LGB rights in the United States should 
 
 2. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and 
Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 930 (2008) (asserting that the survey of international practices 
“confirms, with only a few exceptions, Kees Waaldijk’s hypothesis of a ‘standard sequence’ of 
‘legislative recognition’ of the human right to sexual freedom”); Reg Graycar & Jenni Millbank, From 
Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition, 24 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 121, 138-40 (2007) (contending that even though such progress is not necessarily linear, 
Australia and New Zealand generally follow the “law of small change”); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE 
CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND, 101-03 (2005) (affirming Yuval 
Merin’s theory of the “necessary process”); see also Brief of Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 23, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470088, at 
*23 (Liberty Counsel, an opponent of same-sex marriage, referred to the law of small change in order 
to warn the Court about the consequences of repealing sodomy laws.  It argued that if sodomy laws 
were invalidated by the Supreme Court, same-sex marriage would be the next step.  In its words, 
“Waaldijk’s paper reveals that changes in the law tend to happen at a slow, incremental pace.  This 
Court, therefore, must keep in mind that this case is not just about invalidating sodomy laws, it is 
about the goal of homosexuals to enter into the ‘clubhouse’ of family and marriage as it currently 
exists so as to ‘radically alter’ th[ose] institution[s].”).  But see Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners 
but not Parents / Recognizing Parents but not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the 
United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 713-14 (2000) (“Professor Waaldijk’s analysis of the 
progression in Europe is wholly inapplicable to the United States.  Some of the difference can be 
attributed to the role of the judiciary in the American context.”). 
 3. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, 
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGAL 
RECOGNITION]. 
 4. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE 
OF GAY RIGHTS (2002). 
 5. See generally YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
 6. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 427. 
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focus solely on changes at the state, rather than the federal level, because federal 
law, which has not yet progressed to the second stage, is not ready for such a 
great change.7  It is important to understand that the theory of small change is 
not just a descriptive theory; instead, it provides a normative explanation for the 
effect that each legal change has on the way society views LGB people.  The 
theory of small change also provides a theoretical justification for this 
incremental progress.  It holds that acceptance of same-sex marriage will be 
perceived as a small step once all preceding steps have been achieved, thus 
encouraging LGB organizations to follow these stages. 
Professor of Economics M.V. Lee Badgett offers an important critique of the 
theory of small change.  She astutely warns that “[t]ransferring political lessons 
and experiences from one continent to another runs the risk of ignoring 
important cultural or social differences between countries and continents.”8  She 
suggests that a “conditions for change” approach should supplement the theory 
of small change in order to accurately predict legal recognition of same-sex 
partnerships.  This means taking account of certain factors: rates of heterosexual 
cohabitation, levels of religiosity, and tolerance toward homosexuality.  In 
applying these factors to the United States, Badgett concludes that her empirical 
approach “is at least as good as the incrementalist framework for predicting 
change.”9 
Unfortunately, neither Badgett’s empirical approach nor the incrementalist 
approach provides a good framework for such predictions.  Both theories 
oversimplify the issue and fail to account for the complex and varied factors that 
are relevant to same-sex marriage.  In this Article I argue that the current legal 
situation in Europe and the United States shows that there are various courses 
through which the legalization of same-sex marriage can be achieved, and 
various factors that affect the path to this goal.  I present a range of examples in 
which predictions have not corresponded to reality.  Unlike the theory of small 
change, which relies largely on the experience of the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, my survey looks at all European Union member 
countries.  I use such extensive data because the available evidence from Great 
Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other Northern European 
countries does not hold up to one storyline.  Moreover, these Northern 
European countries have very different attitudes toward—and definitions of—
civil rights than the rest of the world; therefore, any framework that uses their 
experience, rather than that of other European countries, as the main source of 
comparison is not a reliable one. 
 
 7. Eskridge and Spedale also argue that the United States should follow European states’ 
example in achieving acceptance of same-sex marriage through the legislature (rather than through 
the courts).  While I will not explore this idea in detail, the survey of the legal situation in Europe 
shows that in recent years, European LGB people have very often turned to courts to achieve rights 
for same-sex couples, including same-sex marriage.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & DARREN R. 
SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 232-41 
(2006). 
 8. M.V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience in the United 
States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 85 (2005). 
 9. Id. at 84. 
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Following the survey, I proceed to explain why these theories fail to fully 
explain the process that leads to same-sex marriage.  I contend that a main 
problem with the theory of small change is the basic assumption that steps one 
and two (i.e., repeal of sodomy laws and the enactment of antidiscrimination 
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) necessarily 
lead to the third step—legalization of same-sex marriage.  I argue that changing 
legal definitions and societal understandings of marriage in both law and social 
practice is quite different from conferring the right to engage in sexual acts and 
the right not to be discriminated against.  Marriage demands a public 
affirmation that the theory of small change’s earlier stages do not consider.  
Moreover, arguments against legalizing same-sex marriage, although standing 
on equally shaky theoretical ground, are more entrenched than are arguments in 
favor of sodomy laws and against antidiscrimination laws that extend 
protections on the basis of sexual orientation.  I assert that because of these 
factors, changes to marriage laws in the United States will never be perceived as 
small, no matter what prior steps have been taken. 
In the next Part, contrary to those who take a more incrementalist 
approach, I argue that the adoption of civil unions is sometimes a stumbling 
block that can significantly delay legal acceptance of same-sex marriage.  
Granting LGB people the option of civil unions rather than marriage obfuscates 
the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples.  Under most civil union 
arrangements, especially in Europe, same-sex couples receive the same rights 
and benefits as their opposite-sex counterparts.  Thus, the general public 
perceives any discussion of ongoing discrimination, particularly in terms of the 
denial of marriage to LGB couples, as merely semantic.  In addition, since civil 
unions often confer upon LGB people all the economic rights and benefits 
associated with marriage, they mitigate the economic incentives that can 
motivate activists’ efforts to legalize same-sex marriage.  Furthermore, some 
LGB people find civil unions preferable to marriage because they see the latter 
as a patriarchal and discriminatory institution, or, in certain European countries, 
because the declining value of marriage has made it a less desirable option.  In 
arguing that civil unions might impede the legalization of same-sex marriage, I 
do not mean to imply that legal recognition of same-sex marriage should be the 
final goal of the LGB movement, as suggested by the theoreticians of small 
change.10  In fact, it seems that the lesson that the theory of small change misses 
is that many European LGB organizations object to same-sex marriage and are 
more interested in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples.  To the 
extent that same-sex marriage is the goal, however, the effect of civil unions and 
the incremental approach should be clear. 
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part II presents a short overview 
of the ways that same-sex relationships are currently recognized in the 
European Union and the United States in order to explain the terminology used 
in this Article.  Part III offers a review of the existing theories on this subject.  
Part IV surveys the legal recognition of same-sex couples in Europe and in the 
 
 10. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 239 (“This is not to say we believe that gay and lesbian 
advocates and their allies should stop fighting for the immediate right to same-sex marriage.  Full 
marriage equality is the ultimate goal of most gays and lesbians in the United States…”). 
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United States and demonstrates that many of the predictions posited by the 
theory of small change have not been accurate.  Instead, the theory of small 
change has not proved to be a reliable method for predicting the legalization of 
same-sex marriage.  Part V critiques the empirical approach offered by Badgett.  
Part VI questions the assumption that a country, state, or society that is willing 
to decriminalize homosexual acts and enact antidiscrimination laws will 
necessarily be open to legalizing same-sex marriage.  This Part also suggests that 
changes concerning marriage in the United States are never perceived as small.  
Part VII investigates the assumption that the introduction of the institution of 
civil unions raises sufficient awareness of inequalities faced by opposite-sex 
couples and demonstrates that some European LGB organizations and people 
have been more interested in securing partnership rights rather than marriage.  
It also suggests that there is a normative commitment from the side of the 
incrementalists to positing marriage as the end of the LGB struggle for equality.  
Part VIII offers a brief conclusion. 
II. CURRENT MODELS OF RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 
Today there are numerous legal institutions in Europe and the United 
States that offer varying degrees of legal recognition to same-sex couples.11  It is 
common to divide these institutions into three groups or models—civil 
marriage, registered partnerships, and cohabitation—based on the type of legal 
recognition that they provide.12 
Civil marriage is a registered partnership between two persons that results 
in a number of legal rights and obligations (between partners and between the 
couple and others, including the state).  The law regulates numerous aspects of 
the relationship, including how to terminate the marriage.13  Marriage continues 
to be the privileged and preferred legal status in Europe and the United States 
and provides the most expansive recognition of rights by the state.14  The legal 
differences between marriage and other alternatives carry additional 
consequences.  For example, some entities do not treat registered couples as 
married because they do not understand, or do not want to understand, what it 
means.  This can have serious legal implications in everyday life, for example, 
when one needs the help of an administrative agency or any other kind of semi-
state entity.15  Civil marriage also carries a semantic advantage over other kinds 
 
 11. These forms of legal recognition include, marriage, civil unions, registered partnerships, 
reciprocal beneficiary schemes, informal cohabitation, and registered domestic partnerships. 
 12. Kees Waaldijk, Levels of Legal Consequences of Marriage, Cohabitation and Registered Partnership 
for Different-Sex and Same-Sex Partners: Comparative Overview & Comparative Analysis, in SAME-SEX 
COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS & HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A FOCUS ON CROSS-NATIONAL 
DIFFERENTIALS [hereinafter CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS] 47, 48 (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy 
eds., 2004). 
 13. Id. at 77-78. 
 14. MERIN, supra note 5, at 55-56. 
 15. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY 
EQUALITY 114-15 (2004) (the story of Michele Granda and Kate Hogan, a lesbian couple who were on 
vacation in the British Virgin Islands when Ms. Hogan was injured in an accident.  The couple had in 
their possession various documents to ensure that they would be allowed hospital visitation, yet Ms. 
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of legal recognition—while almost everybody in the world knows what 
marriage is, the meaning of other forms of legal recognition, like civil unions, is 
often less clear.16 
The second model, registered partnership,17 is conceived of as a legal 
institution more or less analogous to marriage—essentially an intermediate level 
of recognition, sometimes referred to as “marriage lite.”18  A registered 
partnership, like marriage, results in a number of legal rights and obligations 
(between partners and between the couple and others, including the state),19 and 
certain actions must be taken in order to terminate a registered partnership.20  It 
is important to emphasize that the institution of registered partnership takes 
different forms in different countries and states.  In some countries and states, a 
registered partnership scheme offers nearly all the rights that are associated with 
marriage, while in others this legal institution does not confer many of those 
rights.21  In most places, such as Great Britain and Germany, registered 
partnerships are open only to same-sex couples.22  In some countries, however, 
 
Granda was not allowed to see her partner in the emergency room.  A friend later said: “‘you can do 
some things’ with those documents . . . ‘but you cannot replicate marriage.’”). 
 16. What do same-sex couples who have had civil unions call the ceremony?  How do they refer 
to their new status, or to each other?  It is even more complicated for couples who register as 
reciprocal beneficiaries.  Was I “unioned” yesterday with the love of my life?  Do I send out 
announcements stating: “You are all invited to our registered reciprocal beneficiaries ceremony”? 
The symbolic value of marriage extends beyond the name of the ceremony.  For example, in France, 
heterosexual marriages are performed at the town hall, a culturally important place, while same-sex 
couples can register as partners only at the tribunal d’instance, a court that usually deals with daily-
life conflicts like disputes between property owners and tenants.  See Wilfried Rault, The Best Way to 
Court: The French Mode of Registration and Its Impact on the Social Significance of Partnerships, in CROSS-
NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 27.  On the other hand, in some European countries, the 
names of marriage alternatives have, in the same way as the word “marriage,” become an integral 
part of the language.  For example, in France, the pacte civil de solidarité (civil pact of solidarity, 
known as PaCS, and discussed later in this article) “is now part of the culture, as evidenced by its 
acceptance in the French language: the acronym PaCS is no longer capitalized, as both noun—les 
pacsés—and verb—se pacser—have entered everyday parlance.”  Daniel Borrillo & Eric Fassin, The 
Pacs, Four Years Later: A Beginning or an End?, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 
19. 
 17. This is the European equivalent of the American civil union.  For the purposes of this 
Article, I will refer to these two legal institutions interchangeably. 
 18. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 80. 
 19. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West Supp. 2010) (“‘Civil union’ means the legally 
recognized union of two eligible individuals of the same sex established pursuant to this act.  Parties 
to a civil union shall receive the same benefits and protections and be subject to the same 
responsibilities as spouses in a marriage.”). 
 20. E.g., Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, § 44 (U.K.) (“Subject to section 41, an application for a 
dissolution order may be made to the court by either civil partner on the ground that the civil 
partnership has broken down irretrievably.”). 
 21. For example, registered partnership in Great Britain provides same-sex couples all the rights 
and benefits that are offered to opposite-sex couples.  Conversely, in France, Finland, Ireland, and 
Austria, gay couples cannot jointly adopt even if they are registered.  See, e.g., Kees Waaldijk, 
Overview of Forms of Joint Legal Parenting Available to Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 72 DROIT 
ET SOCIÉTÉ 383, 384 (2009).  In addition, couples in civil unions are often required to demonstrate 
more committed behavior, such as living together for a number of years, while married couples are 
not required to behave similarly in order to register.  See Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to 
Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1203-04 (2010). 
 22. Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 49. 
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including France and the Netherlands, the registration is also open to opposite-
sex couples.23 
Civil unions and registered partnerships not only carry legal and symbolic 
distinctions but also have practical adverse consequences.  Some argue that 
there are negative effects of civil unions on the physical and mental health of 
same-sex couples and their children due to the stigma of living in a separate-
but-equal regime.  Some employers do not extend to couples in civil unions the 
rights and benefits that they grant married couples.24 
For many years, numerous countries did not officially recognize the third 
form of legal recognition, cohabitation.  In the United States during the second 
half of the twentieth century, some states began recognizing and enforcing 
marriage-like contracts in which the parties committed to marriage-like 
obligations.25  Progressively, new laws that at least partly recognize certain 
kinds of cohabitation have been developed, mostly in Europe.26  Today, many 
countries provide a number of legal consequences that arise when two people 
have been informally cohabitating for a certain period of time.  In these 
countries, even in the absence of a contract, a court may, at the request of one 
party, enforce a marriage-like commitment on the other party.27  Usually there is 
no event or formal agreement marking or governing cohabitation, making this 
arrangement different from both marriage and registered partnerships.  This is 
the only legal arrangement in which the partners must actively demand their 
rights in retrospect and provide proof of the nature and extent of their 
relationship to a government agency or court.  It is also the only model that does 
not require an act of termination.  The need for legal recognition frequently 
arises at the end of the relationship—when the couple dissolves the relationship 
or when one partner dies.  This means that cohabiting status is often required by 
only one partner.  In other places, cohabiting couples can register their 
 
 23. Id.  In the United States, civil unions have only recently become an option for opposite-sex 
couples as well (Nevada, the District of Columbia, and Illinois).  See, e.g., Monica Davey, Civil Unions 
Advance in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/12/02/us/02illinois.html (“The legislation allows heterosexual couples to seek civil unions, 
too.”). 
 24. See N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM’N, THE LEGAL, MED., ECON. & SOC. CONSEQUENCES OF 
NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW (2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/CURC-
Final-Report-.pdf (reporting that some New Jersey employers refuse to provide the same benefits to 
employees’ civil union partners that are provided to employees’ opposite-sex spouses.  These 
employers are governed by the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA).  Since DOMA 
limits benefits to the opposite-sex partners of employees, and ERISA is a federal law, these 
employers are not required to recognize same-sex partnerships.) 
 25. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1568 (2009) (“Since the last decades of the twentieth 
century, however, there is a trend to narrow the gap between the mutual obligations of cohabitants 
and those of married partners.”). 
 26. See Kathleen Kiernan, The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western 
Europe, 15 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1 (2001). 
 27. Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 83. 
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partnerships, which make them eligible for a limited set of rights (even more 
limited than those conferred by a civil union).28 
Cohabitation, both informal and registered, provides fewer privileges than 
the other models discussed here.29  Many benefits, especially in the areas of 
parental, tax, and property law, are not available to cohabiting couples.  The 
regulations of cohabitation are very fragmentary, and only a comprehensive 
overview of these laws and regulations could fully demonstrate the legal 
consequences of cohabitation.30  In addition, the rights conferred by cohabitation 
vary from country to country.  In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the 
rights of cohabiting partners are numerous, even greater than those extended to 
couples in registered partnerships in France.31  In most European countries, this 
form of recognition is available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.32  
Discrimination, however, often exists within this model: for example, same-sex 
couples are often denied many of the parental rights granted to opposite-sex 
couples, such as the right to adopt or subsidization of assisted reproduction 
technologies.33 
In the United States, domestic partnership laws vary considerably among 
jurisdictions.34  In some states, domestic partnerships are the equivalent of 
European registered cohabitation, and the rights conferred by registration are 
limited.35  In other jurisdictions, notably California, domestic partnerships are 
equivalent to civil unions because it provides all or almost all the rights 
associated with marriage, but limited to the state level.36  In the United States, 
where marriage is usually a prerequisite for obtaining benefits for an employee’s 
partner, domestic partnership laws allow same-sex couples to enjoy the same 
health care benefits as married couples. 
III. THE THEORY OF SMALL CHANGE 
The most accepted and recognized international theory that explains and 
predicts the legalization of same-sex marriage and advocates the notion of 
incremental progress is Waaldijk’s law of small change.37  This theory not only 
describes how the Netherlands arrived at the legalization of same-sex marriage 
but also uses that data to predict “how, and when, [the legalization of] same-sex 
marriage can be achieved in other countries”38 and to suggest a political and 
 
 28. Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-
Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (2004); MERIN, 
supra note 5, at 136. 
 29. See generally Waaldijk, supra note 28. 
 30. See Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 78-79. 
 31. See id. at 83-84. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. at 83. 
 34. Domestic partnership registries are often offered by cities, towns, employers, and 
universities.  This article addresses only domestic partnerships recognized by states (and the District 
of Columbia).  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-701 (2001). 
 35. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2005);  HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2005). 
 36. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004). 
 37. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 440. 
 38. Id. at 437. 
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legal strategy for the legalization of same-sex marriage.  According to Waaldijk, 
the legal history of the recognition of homosexuality in European countries 
reveals a pattern of steady incremental progress leading to the legal acceptance 
of same-sex marriage.39  This process consists of three stages, each of which 
entails several sub-steps.  The process is initiated with the decriminalization of 
sodomy, after which the age of consent for same-sex relationships is made the 
same as that for opposite-sex relationships (step one).  Following this, legislation 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace 
and housing is enacted and sexual orientation is included as a protected 
category in hate crime laws (step two).  Finally, partnership and parenting rights 
are legally addressed (step three).40 
Waaldijk argues that this theory offers two crucial lessons.  First, a step 
only becomes possible once the previous step has been fulfilled.  Second, each 
step facilitates the next step.  Any legislative change offering legal recognition 
and acceptance of homosexuality can be enacted and accepted by the general 
public only if this change is perceived as small or insignificant.  At the same 
time, the new legal reality must remain sufficiently discriminatory against LGB 
people to satisfy the opponents of LGB rights.41 
Waaldijk shows how Dutch law followed the pattern proposed by the law 
of small change.  After passing through the first two steps, the Netherlands 
began to address partnership issues by offering limited rights to cohabiting 
same-sex couples.  The process continued with the introduction of a registered 
partnership scheme and eventually ended with the legalization of same-sex 
marriage.  Finally, parental rights for married same-sex couples were made 
equal to those of married opposite sex couples.42  Waaldijk suggests that 
countries typically offer registered partnership schemes prior to legalizing same-
sex marriage.  He explains that the introduction of registered partnerships put 
pressure on the Dutch legislature to allow same-sex couples to marry because it 
“served to highlight the remaining discrimination caused by the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage.”43  Waaldijk ultimately posits that his theory 
applies to other countries as well.44 
Merin imports the theory of small change to the United States and clarifies 
what he sees as the “necessary process” leading to legalization of same-sex 
 
 39. It is important to note that Waaldijk characterizes the final stage of recognition only in 
vague terms, describing it as “legislation recognizing same-sex partnership and parenting.”  Id. at 
440.  Does recognition extend to registered partnerships or same-sex marriage?  Or perhaps 
cohabiting same-sex couples?  Waaldijk’s examination of the process as it unfolded in the 
Netherlands suggests that “recognition” actually encompasses all these elements as sub-stages that 
lead to the acceptance of same-sex marriage, starting with acceptance of cohabitation. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See also Polikoff, supra note 2, at 712 (“The European legislation signaled a total separation of 
the approval of lesbian and gay couples as partners from the approval of lesbian and gay couples as 
parents.  In the United States, meanwhile, trial courts had approved joint adoptions in more than 
half the states . . . .”). 
 43. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 447. 
 44. Id. at 439 (“The Netherlands is following the same trends as most other European countries.  
In that light, the opening up of marriage to same-sex couples is only natural.”). 
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marriage.45  He accepts the three-stage process and concludes that “[b]efore 
same-sex marriage becomes possible, the final step of the necessary process 
must be completed, namely, broad recognition in the form of registered 
partnership or civil union—not merely a version of U.S. domestic partner 
scheme as currently construed.”46  In other words, Merin suggests that the 
introduction of civil unions must always precede the legalization of same-sex 
marriage. 
Eskridge advances the theory of small change by offering a more nuanced 
and sophisticated approach that addresses the important component of social 
attitudes.47  He suggests that the “law cannot move unless public opinion 
moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by changes in the law.”48  
Accordingly, as legislation gives more visibility to LGB individuals, society 
becomes more accepting of them.  The more society accepts LGB individuals, the 
easier it is to advance pro-gay changes in law and to legalize same-sex marriage.  
Eskridge thus concludes that “a step-by-step approach is probably a necessary 
way to overcome the politics of disgust so popular in the United States.”49 
Eskridge also uses the theory of small change to defend the institution of 
civil unions.  He argues that the Netherlands’ recognition of same-sex marriage 
was facilitated by its prior recognition of, and successful experience with, the 
registered partnership scheme.  He suggests that civil unions are only one stage 
that inevitably leads to legal acceptance of same-sex marriage and therefore the 
LGB community should accept civil unions as a necessary step in this process.50 
Badgett offers another model for predicting the legal recognition of same-
sex partnerships, based on the European experience, but she uses an empirical 
 
 45. MERIN, supra note 5, at 308-37. 
 46. Id. at 333. 
 47. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4; ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 
31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000) [hereinafter Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate]; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001). 
 48. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 115. 
 49. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 229.  The politics of disgust is driven by emotional 
response.  According to Eskridge and Spedale, this form of politics is most commonly seen in the 
context of attacks on gays and lesbians because many Americans are disgusted by the idea of 
nonprocreative sex.  See id. at 220-23. 
 50. Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, supra note 47, at 650-52.  Finally, Eskridge 
suggests that within the federalist structure, the incremental process will create islands of 
recognition of same-sex partnerships.  Some states will offer same-sex couples the option of 
marriage, others civil unions, and gradually recognition of same-sex couples will become 
contagious, especially among younger generations.  As events unfold, more states will come to 
accept that same-sex marriage does not actually have detrimental effects on society.  Eskridge 
concludes that the same-sex marriage debate should be a normative debate primarily at the state—
rather than the national— level.  Since some U.S. states have only recently repealed their sodomy 
laws, and the second stage of the theory of small change has not been achieved at the federal level 
(i.e., federal antidiscrimination law does not provide protection on the basis of sexual orientation), 
the United States is not ready for such a great change.  In addition, past experience with 
controversial legal issues in the United States, such as miscegenation laws, shows that the Supreme 
Court will not get involved in the early stages of debate but will do so only when the majority of 
states have made the change.  See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 234-47. 
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method to do so.  I will discuss this method in depth in Part V.  In the next Part, 
I will examine whether the predictions offered by the theory of small change 
have been realized. 
IV. A CROSS-NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THEORY OF 
SMALL CHANGE 
This Part presents a description of the legal situation of same-sex 
partnerships in Europe and the United States.  As the following discussion 
demonstrates, the evaluations and predictions offered so far do not stand on 
solid ground.  A survey of the current legal situation in Europe and in the 
United States is necessary, since Waaldijk’s and Merin’s theories are based on 
comparative law in 2000 and 2002, respectively.  Although Eskridge’s analysis is 
more recent, some important events have taken place since 2006 that illustrate 
the weakness of the theory of small change.  Therefore, an updated comparative 
law survey is necessary in order to examine if, in retrospect, the theory’s 
predictions have been accurate. 
As early as 2003, an article published by the members of the Harvard Law 
Review began to cast doubt on the “positive” effect that civil unions have on the 
path to same-sex marriage in Europe.51  The article, which responded to the 
theory of small change, argued that “rapid change is far from the rule in Europe.  
To the contrary, the European experience provides considerable evidence that 
progress may stall, perpetuating the second-class status of same-sex couples.”52  
Moreover, the article astutely noted that “‘small change’ need not mean ‘slow 
change.’”53  In light of these observations, this Part questions whether civil 
unions are only a temporary stage in the struggle for legal recognition of same-
sex marriage or whether there is evidence that civil unions impede the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  It also tests the three-stage assumption by 
looking at whether all the countries and states that have legalized same-sex 
marriage followed the three necessary steps. 
Waaldijk and Eskridge54 base their theories primarily on a comparison of 
the United States with the Nordic countries and the Netherlands.  These 
countries, however, are unique in terms of their social, cultural, and legal 
contexts and thus cannot be said to represent a larger European phenomenon.  
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands share the social model of the 
Nordic countries—a generous welfare state and a strong focus on human 
rights.55  Therefore, these countries demonstrate only the “‘friendly human 
 
 51. Developments in the Law – II. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of 
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004 (2003) [hereinafter Inching 
Down the Aisle]. 
 52. Id. at 2010. 
 53. Id. at 2009. 
 54. In his book Equality Practice, Eskridge, offers a comparison of the laws of a variety of other 
countries.  In his latest book, Gay Marriage for Better or Worse, he and co-author Darren R. Spedale 
focus mainly on the experience of the Nordic countries. 
 55. TORBEN M. ANDERSEN ET AL., THE RESEARCH INST. OF THE FINNISH ECON., THE NORDIC 
MODEL: EMBRACING GLOBALIZATION AND SHARING RISKS (2007), available at http://www.etla.fi/ 
files/1892_the_nordic_model_complete.pdf; see also Philip Jenkins, Religious America and Secular 
Holland (paper presented at the “Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations” conference, Oct. 15-
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rights competition’ of the Nordic countries.”56  In addition, recent research 
claims that “[g]ender equality . . . emerged earlier in the Nordic countries than 
elsewhere in Europe” and thus suggests that the Nordic countries demonstrate 
the “Nordic Model of Marriage”—a unique progressive and equal attitude 
toward marriage and divorce.57  Because they are not representative of the 
European context as a whole, an examination of other members of the European 
Union, especially the influential legal systems of Germany, France, and Great 
Britain, is necessary. 
It is important to keep in mind that the European experience is inherently 
different from that of the United States.  Because the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) has held that sodomy laws contradict58 the principles of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,59 
every country in the European Union that once had sodomy laws has repealed 
them.  In addition, every member of the European Union has enacted 
antidiscrimination laws that protect LGB people as a prerequisite for 
membership in the European Union.60  Conversely, in the United States, while 
sodomy laws are unconstitutional, only twenty states extend protection on the 
basis of sexual orientation in their antidiscrimination laws,61 and federal 
antidiscrimination law does not include sexual orientation as a protected 
category.62  Thus, discussion of the European Union member countries will 
focus mainly on the level of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships.  I will 
use the common method of dividing Europe into four geographical areas: 
Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern. 
A. Same-Sex Partnership Recognition in Europe 
Northern Europe: The Nordic countries63 were the first to recognize same-
sex partnerships and still lead in their extensive recognition of LGB rights.  
Generally speaking, they followed the stages of the theory of small change.  
Since Denmark introduced the option of registered partnerships for same-sex 
couples in 1989, analogous laws have been enacted in all four other 
 
16, 2009), available at http://www.roosevelt.nl/Content/RSC/docs/ Jenkins.pdf (“For multiple 
reasons, it is extremely difficult to compare the US and the Netherlands.”). 
 56. Inching Down the Aisle, supra note 51, at 2010 (quoting Robert Wintemute, Conclusion to 
LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 759, 770-71). 
 57. Kari Melby et al., The Nordic Model of Marriage, 15 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 651 (2006). 
 58. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981). 
 59. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 60. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 13, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 
340). 
 61. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES, available at 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf (last updated July 26, 2010); 
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(a)- 81(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., art. 49B § 5 
(LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 62. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) to (e)-17 (2006). 
 63. I use the terms “Scandinavia” and “the Nordic countries” interchangeably to refer to all 
members in the Nordic Council, namely, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. 
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Scandinavian countries:64 Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.  Sweden, 
Norway, and Iceland recently amended their marriage laws, making them 
gender neutral.65  In Finland there are signs that same-sex marriage will be 
legalized soon.66 
Even after the introduction of registered partnerships, same-sex couples 
were still denied some rights and benefits across the Nordic countries.  In 
Denmark, for example, same-sex couples were denied the access to subsidized 
assisted reproductive technologies until 2007,67 and it was not until 2010 that the 
law was amended to allow joint adoption by same-sex couples.68 
Even though the Nordic countries followed the incremental process, 
Denmark is an exception to the rule.  Denmark’s proposal to allow same-sex 
couples to marry was rejected by the government in 2006.  When the Danish 
parliament debated whether or not to legalize same-sex marriage, the Danish 
Minister for the Family, Carina Christensen, argued that since civil unions 
already provide all the rights enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples to same-
sex couples (except for the ability to marry in a church), registered partnerships 
are satisfactory and not discriminatory.69 
The Nordic countries offer a challenge to the theory of small change 
because they illustrate the double-edged nature of registered partnerships.  On 
the one hand, the Nordic countries were the first to enact laws regulating same-
sex relationships and have since generally followed the theory of small change—
they all gradually fixed inequities faced by same-sex couples.  Norway, Sweden, 
and Iceland even took the final step and now legally recognize same-sex 
marriage.70  On the other hand, Denmark provides striking proof of the 
problems associated with registered partnerships—change is slow.  Denmark 
was the first country to recognize same-sex relationships twenty years ago, but it 
currently remains at the same level of limited recognition, with no signs of 
change on the horizon. 
 
 64. Jens Rydström, From Outlaw to In-Law on Registered Partnerships for Homosexuals in 
Scandinavia, Its History and Cultural Implications, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 
175. 
 65. Norway: Same-Sex Marriage Permitted, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/world/europe/18briefings-SAMESEXMARRI_BRF.html; Iceland 
Passes Gay Marriage Law in Unanimous Vote, REUTERS, June 11, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSTRE65A3V020100611. 
 66. See Gender-Neutral Marriage Law Possible by 2012, YLE, http://www.yle.fi/ uutiset/news/ 
2010/07/gender-neutral_marriage_law_possible_by_2012_1804013.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 67. Jens Rydström, Legalizing Love in a Cold Climate: The History, Consequences and Recent 
Developments of Registered Partnership in Scandinavia, 11 SEXUALITIES 193, 209 (2008). 
 68. Gays Given Equal Adoption Rights, COPENHAGEN POST, May 5, 2010, http://www.cphpost.dk/ 
component/content/48896.html?task=view. 
 69. Carina Christensen, Minister for the Family (Den.), Address to Parliament on Proposal for a 
Parliamentary Decision to Introduce a Marriage Law that Equates Homosexuals with Heterosexuals 
(Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/tingdok.aspx?/samling/20061/beslutningsforslag/ 
b76/beh1/1/forhandling.htm&startItem=#nav. 
 70. Generally, even when the Swedish experience, which took fourteen years to move from civil 
unions to marriage, is taken into account, the experience of Nordic countries suggests a theory of 
slow change rather than small change, because progress has been so very markedly slow. 
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Western Europe: All the countries in this region of Europe have enacted 
laws recognizing same-sex relationships.  Belgium71 and the Netherlands both 
allow same-sex couples to marry.  The rest—France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Luxemburg, Ireland,72 and Austria73—offer the option of registered 
partnerships, each with its own unique characteristics.  Belgium, France, and 
Germany also recognize cohabitation of same-sex couples.74 
France and Germany: In 1999, France enacted the pacte civil de solidarité 
(PaCS), which is open to both same- and opposite-sex couples.  The PaCS is very 
popular in France, especially among opposite-sex couples.75  One of the limited 
legal institutions recognizing same-sex partnerships in Europe, the PaCS is a 
contract76 and is not part of the marriage section of the civil code.77  The PaCS is 
not just symbolically different from marriage; it is legally different as well.  A 
registered PaCS may be terminated without judicial intervention and does not 
 
 71. See Paul Borghs & Bart Eeckhout, LGB Rights in Belgium, 1999-2007: A Historical Survey of a 
Velvet Revolution, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1 (2010).  In 2003, Belgium became the second country to 
open up the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples, when the parliament amended the 
country’s civil code.  Belgium also offers a registered-cohabitation option, open to both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples, providing limited rights.  However, same-sex couples did not, until recently, 
have the right to adoption of any kind, and only in 2006 did the parliament pass a bill permitting 
same-sex couples to adopt.  According to Waaldijk, Belgium also followed the law of small change.  
However, it is interesting to note that Belgium first addressed partnership rights by offering legal 
recognition to same-sex cohabiting couples, even though it provided only a minimal level of 
recognition, and later by enacting antidiscrimination laws.  Waaldijk, supra note 28, at 572. 
 72. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988).  After this decision, Ireland, a 
predominantly Catholic country, decriminalized homosexual sex in 1993, declaring that statutes 
criminalizing homosexual sex violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  Until then, decriminalization was at the heart of the gay 
community’s campaign for equality.  See also Fergus Ryan, From Stonewall(s) to Picket Fences: The 
Mainstreaming of Same-Sex Couples in Contemporary Legal Discourses, in COMMITTED RELATIONSHIPS 
AND THE LAW 1, 10 (Oran Doyle & William Binchy eds., 2007); Charlie Taylor, Civil Partnership Bill 
Signed into Law, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 8, 2010,  http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/ 
2010/0719/breaking29.html (A Civil Partnership bill was signed into law in 2010, but it is very 
unlikely that same-sex marriage will be offered in Ireland any time soon.). 
 73. See Austrian Parliament Adopts Registered Partnership Law for Same-Sex Partners, INT’L LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASSOC. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/ 
guide/country_by_country/austria/austrian_parliament_adopts_registered_partnership_law_for_s
ame_sex_partners (In 2010, after many efforts by the LGB community, a registered partnership bill 
was signed into law in Austria.). 
 74. See CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 40 (In France, for example, both same-
sex and opposite-sex couples can register for a certificat de concubinage notoire, which offers minimal 
rights and responsibilities and has uncomplimentary overtones.  The situation of concubinage only 
allows for certain benefits received by one partner to be extended to the other partner and does not 
offer assistance on issues regarding property, taxes, etc.). 
 75. In 2009, for example, 175,000 PaCS’s were registered, as opposed to 256,000 marriages, and 
only 5 percent were same-sex couples.  Deux pacs pour trois mariages, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA 
STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1276/ 
ip1276.pdf. 
 76. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 515-1 (Fr.). (“A civil covenant of solidarity is a contract entered into 
by two natural persons of age, of different sexes or of a same sex, to organize their common life.”). 
 77. Joëlle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is it Moving Towards Marriage?, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & 
FAM. 310, 312 (2007) (“According to Article 515-1Civ.C, Pacs is a contract . . . .”). 
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confer nationality on non-French citizens.78  The law discriminates between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples with regard to prenatal rights.79  In 2006, a 
few amendments beneficial to PaCS couples were made, such as providing 
better protection for the surviving partner in the event of the death of an 
individual in a PaCS,80 but the essence of its character has not changed.81  Same-
sex couples in France still lack basic parental rights, and a challenge to 
discriminatory adoption policies is currently pending in the ECHR.82 
Daniel Borrillo and Eric Fassin point out that since the passage of the PaCS 
legislation, both the LGB movement’s pressure on the government and the 
intensity of the debate have decreased;83 those who supported the PaCS in the 
beginning now fear that it has led to a “dead end.”84  Some have argued that the 
changes to the PaCS in 2006 were intended to decrease pressure on the 
government to move forward with the legalization of same-sex marriage.85  In a 
recent development, the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest court of 
 
 78. See Rault, supra note 16, at 27 (Like the registration process, conflicts between the partners 
are dealt with by the tribunal d’instance, not by the juge aux affaires familiales, who is authorized to 
address marriage issues.). 
 79. The greatest absurdity was that until 2008, single women were eligible for subsidized 
artificial insemination, while same-sex couples were not.  Generally, all parental rights—except for 
cross-adoption—were prohibited.  However, recent intervention by the ECHR somewhat rectified 
the matter.  E.B. v France, App. No. 43546/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int.  In February 1998, a woman in a same-sex couple applied for approval as a 
possible adoptive parent, but her application was rejected because of her sexual orientation.  In June 
2002, the Conseil d'État upheld the rejection of her application.  She argued that the decision was a 
breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.  Article 8 guarantees the right to a private family life, while Article 14 
stipulates that the enjoyment of such rights must be secured without discrimination on any grounds.  
In 2008, the ECHR held that in rejecting the woman’s application for authorization to adopt, the 
domestic French authorities had made a distinction based on considerations regarding her sexual 
orientation, a distinction that is unacceptable under the Convention.  Therefore, it seems that this 
decision applies to all of the countries that are parties to the Convention and allow two single people 
to adopt children.  It is not yet certain how each country will react to it and what the implications 
will be. 
 80. Loi 2006-728 du 23 juin 2006 portant réforme des successions et des libéralités [Law 2006-728 
of June 23, 2006 on the Reform of Inheritance and Gifts], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 24, 2006, p. 9513. 
 81. Since 2008, same-sex couples who marry abroad have been able to gain recognition in 
France as married couples for tax purposes only.  This change came about after a Dutch male couple 
who had married legally in the Netherlands sought official recognition of their marriage in France.  
Jean-Pierre Stroobants, La France reconnaît le mariage d’un couple d’hommes néerlandais, LE MONDE, 
Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/09/05/la-france-reconnait-le-mariage-
d-un-couple-d-hommes-neerlandais_1091846_3214.html (Fr.). 
 82. Gas v. France, App. No. 25951/07 (challenging the denial of a lesbian couple’s request for 
cross-adoption). 
 83. Borrillo & Fassin, supra note 12, at 19. 
 84. Borrillo and Fassin, however, acknowledge that the PaCS did have a positive effect on 
society in that society has generally become more tolerant of LGB relationships.  Yet the law is still 
frozen and has not followed subsequent changes in society.  Id. at 25 (“This means that the law 
shapes society, of course; but as society evolves, the law may have soon enough to catch up with 
further evolutions of society.  Unless outside pressure (from the European Union) forces change, 
without waiting for public opinion.”). 
 85. Godard, supra note 77, at 318. 
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appeals, ordered the Constitutional Council to rule on whether the French ban 
on same-sex marriage violates the state constitution.86 
The German Lower House of Parliament adopted a bill titled the Law on 
Ending Discrimination against Same-Sex Communities: Lifetime Partnership 
Act, which came into full force in 2001.  Unlike the PaCS, the life partnership 
law mainly duplicates the part of the German civil code that governs marriage 
between members of the opposite sex and offers this option only to same-sex 
couples.87  Following a recent ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, same-
sex couples are eligible for all the rights that are associated with marriage.88  
However, it is not clear that Germany is headed toward legalization of same-sex 
marriage, because it appears that same-sex marriage will probably face a 
constitutional challenge.89  Recently, a gay couple who married in Canada asked 
the German Court to recognize their marriage.  The Court recognized their 
marriage as a lifetime partnership, not as a marriage.90 
 
 86. Drew Singer, France Court Orders Review of Same-Sex Marriage Ban, JURIST (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/france-court-%20orders-review-of-same-sex-marriage-
ban.php.  This is an interesting development: even if the Constitutional Council decides that the ban 
on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional, this situation demonstrates why the generalization of the 
European experience provides an unreliable legal framework.  Eskridge and Spedale argue that “[a] 
very important lesson that the Scandinavian experience has for the United States is that the focus of 
democratic deliberation should be the legislature.”  ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 234.  But a 
broader look at Europe tells us the Europeans also try to use the courts whenever they can.  See also 
infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Andreas Maurer, Federal Constitutional Court To Decide Whether to Issue a Temporary 
Injunction Against Germany's New Lifetime Partnerships Law for Homosexual Couples, 2 GERMAN L.J. 
(2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=42 (In 2004, 
the Life Partnership Act (Revised) was passed in the Lower House of Parliament, increasing the 
rights of registered life partners to include, inter alia, the possibility of adoption and simpler alimony 
and divorce rules, but excluding the tax benefits gained through marriage.). 
 88. See German Top Court Boosts Gay Couples’ Pension Rights, EXPATICA.COM, Oct. 23, 2009, 
http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/German-top-court-boosts-gay-couples_-
pension-rights-_57500.html; David Levitz, Germany's Gay Couples to Receive Equal Inheritance Tax 
Rights, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5918626,00.html. 
 89. Following the enactment of the registered partnership, the center-right parties in Germany’s 
Federal Constitutional Court challenged the Lifetime Partnership Act.  The court held the Act 
constitutional by a 5-3 majority.  The main substantive argument against the law was that the Act 
conflicts with the freedom to marriage guaranteed in Article 6 of the German Constitution.  The 
majority held that the freedom to marry is not affected by the Act, because the institution of lifetime 
partnership does not pose an obstacle to those wishing to entering into marriage, as it deals 
exclusively with same-sex couples.  Marriage, according to the majority, is not defined in the 
German Constitution but could be interpreted as a union between one woman and one man.  It 
seems, therefore, that this case creates an obstacle to future legislation attempting to legalize same-
sex marriage.  Indeed, according to the dissenting opinion, Article 6 prevents the legislature from 
extending its substantive protection to same-sex couples.  See Russell Miller & Volker Röben, 
Constitutional Court Upholds Lifetime Partnership Act, 3 GERMAN L.J. ¶ 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=176; see also Mathias Möschel, 
Germany’s Life Partnerships: Separate and Unequal? 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37, 39 (2009-2010) (describing 
“some of the highly problematic assumptions and rhetorical and strategic moves used by German 
judges to justify the unequal treatment of life partnerships and marriage.”). 
 90. Court Rules Germany Must Recognise Foreign Gay Marriages, LOCAL, Jun. 15, 2010, 
http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100615-27871.html (“The court agreed with the view of the 
authorities that he could not be registered as ‘married’ because a marriage under German law 
requires different-sex couples”). 
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Great Britain: Great Britain represents a comprehensive model for 
registered partnerships.  The Civil Partnership Act of 2004 provides same-sex 
couples with rights and responsibilities identical to those offered by civil 
marriage.91  Before this, there was no recognition of same-sex relationships in 
Great Britain.92 
In 2003, Susan Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger were legally married in 
Canada and then returned home to England.  Great Britain did not accept their 
marriage and recognized their relationship only as a civil partnership.  In 2006, 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger sought a declaration that their Canadian marriage be 
considered a marriage in England.93  As it was not recognized, they asked for a 
declaration of incompatibility with Section 4 of the Human Rights Act of 1998.  
In refusing to grant the declaration, the House of Lords held that the United 
Kingdom’s Parliament, when enacting the Civil Partnership Act, implicitly 
expressed its wish not to allow marriage for same-sex couples.  The court’s 
strong defense of the Act’s benefits, which was not legally necessary for its 
holding, was very conservative: “By withholding from same-sex partners the 
actual title and status of marriage, the Government declined to alter the deep-
rooted and almost universal recognition of marriage as a relationship between a 
man and a woman.”94  Considering the court’s rhetoric and the general 
environment, it seems likely that it will not extend marriage rights to same-sex 
couples in the near future.95 
 
 91. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.) (Civil partners are entitled to the same property 
rights as married opposite-sex couples, and the same exemptions as married couples on inheritance 
tax, social security, and pension benefits.  The Act also grants individuals in civil partnerships the 
ability to obtain parental responsibility for a partner’s child.). 
 92. See Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 (H.L.) [133] (appeal taken from England) (As 
early as 1866, marriage was defined as the union of “one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all 
others.”); Talbot v. Talbot, [1967] 111 Sol. J. 213 (A woman went through a marriage ceremony with a 
person whom she believed was a man but who turned out to be a woman.  The marriage was 
annulled, and it was concluded that “there was plainly no marriage and [the court] pronounced a 
decree nisi (of nullity) saying that the decree could be made absolute forthwith.”).  Subsequently, 
section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was amended to declare that marriage between two 
people of the same sex is a cause to invalidate the marriage. 
 93. Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2022, [75] (Eng.). 
 94. Id. ¶ 88. 
 95. Another indication of the unwillingness of the British legislature to open marriage to same-
sex couples is the position of the United Kingdom in the submission to the European Court of Justice 
of a case involving an Austrian gay couple who registered as civil partners in England.  The couple 
brought a claim against the Austrian government for their refusal to recognize their status as civil 
partners in Austria.  The United Kingdom submitted to the court an opinion arguing that the 
Austrian government should not recognize the couple’s status.  Why should the United Kingdom 
argue against recognition of a status that it conferred?  There is only one reasonable explanation.  
The United Kingdom was probably concerned that if the European Court of Justice ruled that 
Austria has a duty to recognize marital status conferred by another country, a similar argument 
could be made that the United Kingdom has a duty to recognize same-sex marriages from other EU 
countries.  Afua Hirsch, UK Challenged the Right to Civil Partnerships of Gay Couples Abroad, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/dec/09/civil-partnership-rights-
austria-uk. 
Aloni_proof_022311 2/23/2011  12:48:26 PM 
 THE POSSIBILITY OF PREDICTING LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 123 
For a portion of the LGB community in the United Kingdom, civil 
partnership may be more desirable than marriage.96  Though I will discuss this 
in greater detail infra, it is important to note that Stonewall, one of Britain’s 
bigger and important LGB organizations, pushed for the enactment of civil 
partnerships instead of civil marriage because they thought it was a better 
option for LGB people.97  However, straight and LGB activists recently initiated 
the Equal Love Campaign, in which they aim to challenge in the ECHR the ban 
on same-sex marriage and, simultaneously, dispute the ban forbidding opposite-
sex couples from registering as civil partners.98 
The Netherlands: In 1998, the Netherlands introduced a legal scheme 
making registered partnerships an option available to both same- and opposite-
sex couples.  In 2001, it became the first country in the world to open up the 
institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples.99  Following the next step of the 
theory of small change, parental rights laws were amended to grant same-sex 
couples equal parental rights.  In 2005, the parliament eliminated the law 
disallowing same-sex couples from adopting children from abroad, thus 
repealing the only discriminatory provision that remained in its laws.100  
According to Waaldijk, the fact that it was the first nation to offer same-sex 
marriage is can be attributed to the incremental process, the secular nature of the 
country, and a long tradition of tolerance toward the LGB community.101 
Southern Europe: Litigation for the recognition of same-sex marriage was 
unsuccessful in Spain during the 1990s.102  By 2005 nearly all the autonomous 
regions in the country had some form of registered partnership.  However, 
when the socialist party proposed same-sex marriage legislation, massive 
 
 96. Sir Elton John, for example, said recently, “I don't want to be married…David and I are not 
married.  Let’s get that right.  We have a civil partnership.  What is wrong with Proposition 8 is that 
they went for marriage.  Marriage is going to put a lot of people off.  It's the word marriage.”  He 
believes that same-sex couples should be happy with a civil partnership, as it gives them the same 
legal rights and protection as opposite-sex couples.  “I'm very happy with a civil partnership.  If gay 
people want to get married, or get together, they should have a civil partnership.” Tim Walker, Sir 
Elton John: I Would Not Be Anyone's Wife, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2008. 
 97. See Beccy Shipman & Carol Smart, “It’s Made a Huge Difference”: Recognition, Rights and the 
Personal Significance of Civil Partnership, 12 SOC. RES. ONLINE ¶ 2.5 (2007), http://  
www.socresonline.org.uk/12/1/shipman.html (“Although Stonewall used the language of equal 
rights, they did not argue for simply expanding the institution of marriage to include homosexuals 
(as has happened in Canada).  Instead they argued that Civil Partnership was preferable to marriage 
because it should be seen as a twenty-first century means of recognising modern relationships and 
that this was preferable to attempting to radicalise the traditional notion of marriage.”). 
 98. Adam Gabbatt, European Court Urged to End UK Marriage “Apartheid,” GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/dec/19/european-court-marriage-civil-
partnerships. 
 99. See Waaldijk, supra note 28, at 572 (The Dutch parliament made this change by amending 
Article 30 of Book 1 of the Dutch civil code to provide: “A marriage can be contracted by two 
persons of different sex or of the same sex.”). 
 100. See id. at 575 (There is concern that countries will prohibit international adoption to 
countries where children might be given to same-sex couples.  This concern was minimized after 
South Africa, one of the countries from which children commonly arrive, announced that it would 
allow same-sex marriage.). 
 101. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 474. 
 102. See José Ignacio Pichardo Galán, Same-Sex Couples in Spain: Historical, Contextual and Symbolic 
Factors, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 159, 160-62. 
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opposition arose, including a huge demonstration of half a million people 
against the legislation.103  Nevertheless, the legislation passed in 2005, and Spain 
became the third country in the world to recognize same-sex marriage. 
Portugal presents a similar story.  In 2001, the Portuguese legislature 
introduced a weak registered partnership scheme for same-sex couples living 
together for more than two years as a “de facto” union.104  Recently, however, 
the Portuguese parliament passed a bill to legalize same-sex marriage; it became 
effective in June 2010.105  Therefore, it seems that both Spain and Portugal 
conform to the incremental pattern. 
Italy, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus are the least developed with regards to 
same-sex marriage.106  None of these countries offer recognition of any kind for 
same-sex couples.  Article 29 of the Italian Constitution of 1948 stipulates, “The 
Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society based on 
marriage.”  This was invoked as a strong argument against opening marriage to 
same-sex couples, and most scholars interpret this Article as preventing the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.107  Although a few scholars have suggested 
different interpretations, this is still the common belief.108  The discussion has 
been on the national agenda for years, and though a small number of proposals 
have been discussed by the legislature, they have not led to significant results.  
Serious attempts by the Government of Romano Prodi in 2007 to introduce 
legislation failed after members of the governing coalition threatened division in 
opposition to the proposals.  The main proposal called for a patto civile di 
solidarietà (PaCS), but it offered even fewer rights than its French counterpart.109  
 
 103. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 84-85. 
 104. See Rosa Martins, Same-Sex Partnerships in Portugal: From De Facto to De Jure?, 4 UTRECHT L. 
REV., no. 2, June 2008 at 194, 195, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/ 
view/74/74 (The institution of registered partnerships denied same-sex partners many financial, 
property, and prenatal rights granted to married couples.). 
 105. See Portugal Allows Same-Sex Marriage, ABC NEWS, May 18, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/ 
news/stories/2010/05/18/2903000.htm. 
 106. See Themis Katsagiannis, Parliament Denies Recognition of Same Sex Partners, ILGA EUR., Aug. 
4, 2009, available at http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/guide/country_by_country/greece/ 
Parliament-denies-recognition-of-same-sex-partners (In Greece, the institution of cohabitation 
recently received recognition.  The legislature conferred a few rights upon unmarried couples, but 
explicitly included only opposite-sex couples.  A bill to confer a limited set of rights on same-sex 
partners was rejected by the parliament.); Anthee Carassava,  Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Greece, 
N.Y. TIMES,  June 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/world/ europe/04greece.html (A 
minor scandal occurred when the mayor of a small island married a few same-sex couples.); David 
Frueh, Greece Justice Minister Denounces First Same-Sex Marriages, JURIST, June 4, 2008, available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/06/greece-justice-minister-denounces-first.php (The 
Greek Justice Minister quickly declared the marriages “non-existent.”); Kees Waaldijk, supra note 21, 
at 384 (Malta does not recognize same-sex partnerships at all.). 
 107. See Gioia Scappucci, Italy Walking a Tightrope Between Stockholm and the Vatican: Will Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships Ever Occur?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 519, 529-30. 
 108. Matteo Bonini Baraldi, Family vs. Solidarity: Recent Epiphanies of the Italian Reductionist 
Anomaly in the Debate on De Facto Couples, 4 UTRECHT L. REV., no. 2, June 2008 at 175, 
http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3
A10-1-101092/73. 
 109. The Italian proposal also allowed partnership registration for family members other than 
first-degree relatives.  For example, cousins would be able to register as partners and achieve the 
same rights as same-sex couples. 
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Hence, it is very unlikely that Italy will move toward the legalization of same-
sex marriage anytime soon.110 
Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries are the newest members of the 
European Union and generally lag behind their European Union counterparts 
with regard to same-sex marriage.  Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro all 
decriminalized homosexual conduct in 1976, significantly earlier than their 
neighbors Serbia and Kosovo (1994), Macedonia (1997), and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1998).  In Slovenia, a 2006 law provides a weak level of registered 
partnership;111 though it lacks many provisions concerning parental rights and 
financial benefits.112  Recently, however, a bill legalizing same-sex marriage and 
permitting same-sex couples to adopt passed in the lower house of parliament 
and is now pending in the Labour, Family and Social Affairs Committee.113 
Based on the necessary steps of the theory of small change, Merin 
suggested in 2002 that the Czech Republic belongs to a group that is “not likely 
to recognize same-sex couples anytime soon.”114  Nevertheless, the Czech 
Republic introduced a registered partnership scheme in 2006 and an amendment 
to grant greater rights to registered partners in June 2008, effectively making 
registered partners closer in legal status to married couples.115 
In 1995, the Hungarian Constitutional Court held that marriage is restricted 
to opposite-sex couples, though it took a more liberal approach in recognizing 
the cohabitation rights of same-sex couples.  After years of attempts to legislate 
registered partnerships in Hungary, the parliament adopted such a scheme for 
 
 110. The Italian court system has also proven to be ineffective, as illustrated by the case of a 
lesbian couple caught up in a controversy over a child raised by both women.  After the couple 
ended their relationship, the nonbiological mother asked the court for custody.  The court held that, 
as they were not a family according to the law, she lacked standing to resolve the dispute.  Baraldi, 
supra note 108, at 192 (“The court could only conclude that, according to current Italian law, only 
(biological or adoptive) parents have standing in court for such requests.  Therefore, it had to turn 
down the application for contact on grounds of lack of standing.”). 
 111. Roman Kuhar, The Impracticability of Active Citizenship Beyond the Closet in Slovenia, in THE 
GAYS’ AND LESBIANS’ RIGHTS IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 147, 151-52 (Anne Weyembergh & 
Sinziana Carstocea eds., 2006). 
 112. See Matej Avbelj & Arne Marjan Mavčič, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation – Slovenia, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – FRA 
5 (Feb. 2008), available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-hdgso-NR_SI.pdf 
(discussing the lack of provisions concerning children and other shortcomings of the Slovenian law). 
 113. Family Law Debate Remains Stuck at Beginning, SLOVENIA TISKOVNA ANGENCIJA, May 5, 2010, 
http://www.sta.si/en/vest.php?s=a&id=1509509; Slovenia First Ex-Communist Country with Gay 
Marriage?, GAY MARRIAGE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.thegaymarriageblog.com/ 
2010/09/slovenia-to-be-first-ex-communist-country-with-gay-marriage;  The Status of Same-Sex 
Marriage World-Wide, UNITED FAMS. INT’L BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009, 12:03 PM) http:// 
unitedfamiliesinternational.wordpress.com/2009/12/09/the-status-of-same-sex-marriage-world-
wide/. 
 114. MERIN, supra note 5, at 331. 
 115. See ILGA Eur. & Global Rights, The Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights in 
the Czech Republic: Submission to the Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic Review (1st Session), 
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW (July 2007), http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/ 
CZ/ILGA_CZE_UPR_S1_2008_InternationalLesbianandGayAssociation_uprsubmission.pdf. 
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both same-sex and opposite-sex couples in December 2007.116  On December 23, 
2008, however, the Constitutional Court struck down the law, holding that the 
law allowing opposite-sex couples to enter into registered partnerships 
diminished the value of constitutionally guaranteed heterosexual marriage.117  
The Hungarian parliament thus passed the bill again, this time allowing 
registered partnerships for same-sex couples only. 
In Poland, three attempts to legislate registered partnership have all been 
rejected, and it seems highly unlikely that the current government will support 
such a bill.118  In Romania, the Senate voted in 2008 to amend the Family Code to 
define marriage as the union between a man and a woman.119  There is strong 
resistance to same-sex partner registration in the Baltic States of Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia120 and in Latvia there is a constitutional ban on same-sex 
marriage.121 
In sum, this survey of the legal situation in Europe offers a few lessons.  
First, some countries, mainly in Scandinavia, have followed the pattern 
suggested by the theory of small change.  Second, it is not yet clear that same-
sex marriage in Europe is inevitable or even that it is likely to be the final stage 
in some countries.  Whether the eastern and southern countries will ever open 
marriage to same-sex couples is a question of great importance.  It is also not 
clear whether the other members of the European Union will permit same-sex 
marriage in the future or will stay with civil unions.  Indeed, the most influential 
legal systems in Europe seem determined to offer legal recognition only through 
civil unions and do not appear inclined to allow same-sex marriage in the near 
future.  I do not, however, argue that these countries will never offer same-sex 
marriage.  For example, it is likely that Denmark will, at some point, expand the 
institution of marriage to include same-sex couples.122  But until it does, 
describing the effect of civil unions in Belgium and the Netherlands as the 
general rule while disregarding the effect that civil unions have had in other 
countries such as Denmark paints an inaccurate picture.  Clearly, the European 
Union will soon require member states to recognize same-sex partnerships, but 
 
 116. See Orsolya Szeibert-Erdős, Same-Sex Partners in Hungary: Cohabitation and Registered 
Partnership, 4 UTRECHT L. REV., no. 2, June 2008, at 212, 212, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/ 
index.php/ulr/article/view/75/75. 
 117. See Ellen M. Rice, Hungarian Court Strikes Down Heterosexual and Same-Sex Civil Unions Over 
Damage to the Family, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008/dec/ 
08121605.html. 
 118. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships Within the 
European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949, 1960 (2008). 
 119. Romania: Discriminatory Partnership and Adoption Provisions in New Civil Code, INT’L GAY & 
LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (July 30, 2009), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/ 
takeaction/resourcecenter/953.html. 
 120. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 118. 
 121. See Merle Haruoja et al., Thematic Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of 
Sexual Orientation (Estonia), EDZ ARCHIDOK (Feb. 2008), http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/ 
daten/edz-b/ebr/08/FRA-hdgso-NR_EE.pdf. 
 122. See Associated Press, Europe Split on Gay Marriage, GAY NEWS FROM 365GAY.COM (Dec. 18, 
2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20080129053504/http://www.365gay.com/Newscon06/12/121806euPoll 
.htm  (In a poll conducted by the European Union, sixty-nine percent of Denmark’s population 
supported same-sex marriage, placing Denmark third, behind Sweden and the Netherlands.). 
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it will likely allow individual states to decide whether to offer the option of 
marriage or unions.123  Recently the European Court of Human Rights held, in a 
4-3 decision, that the member states of the European Council have no obligation 
to allow same-sex marriage.124  Third, this study suggests that civil unions 
should not be understood as necessarily catalyzing the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, as civil unions can actually often impede it.  Finally, it is clear that in 
many countries the courts have been active in granting LGB individuals equal 
rights, and in many other countries the intervention of the courts has been 
requested by LGB people.  Contrary to the common belief concerning the 
European courts’ lack of involvement in the recognition of same-sex couples, 
this study shows that in most European countries, LGB people have petitioned 
both the national courts and the European Court of Human Rights, and that 
some of these courts have been very active in denying or granting same-sex 
couples the right to marry. 
B. Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the United States 
Generally speaking, while some states, such as Vermont125 and 
Connecticut,126 have followed the theory of small change, other states have 
 
 123. The European Union Parliament has often demonstrated its commitment to LGB rights 
generally and to legal recognition of same-sex partnerships specifically.  In 2003 it delivered the 
following resolution, calling on “Member States to abolish all forms of discrimination—whether 
legislative or de facto—which are still suffered by homosexuals, in particular as regards the right to 
marry and adopt children.”  European Parliament Resolution on the Situation as Regards 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2002/2013(INI)) ¶ 77 (2002).  
Recently, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution calling for all EU member states to 
engage in “the mutual recognition of the effects of civil status documents.”  EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(2010/2080(INI)) (2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang 
=en&procnum=INI/2010/2080.  Eskridge and Spedale estimate that “[a]t some point, the European 
Union will impose some uniform requirement upon its member states.”  ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra 
note 7, at 241.  A uniform requirement, however, does not necessarily mean marriage, but more 
likely means a demand to offer same-sex couples the same rights as opposite-sex couples. 
 124. Case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS.,  http://www.echr.coe.int/ echr/en/ 
header/press/multimedia/webcasts+of+public+hearings/webcasts2010.htm (follow “Judgment of 
24/06/10” hyperlink). 
 125. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (requiring statutory benefits for same-sex 
couples).  At the time of the Baker decision, Vermont had already decriminalized sodomy laws and 
introduced antidiscrimination laws.  Id. at 891 (Dooley, J. concurring).  Then in 1999, the Vermont 
Supreme Court ruled, based on the state constitution, that same-sex couples must be granted rights 
and privileges equal to those granted to married opposite-sex couples.  Id. at 867.  While the final 
implementation was left to the state legislature, the justices declared that “Whatever system is 
chosen . . . must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common 
benefit, protection, and security of the law.”  Id.  The state legislature then embraced the idea of civil 
unions and recently voted to allow marriage between members of the same sex.  2009 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 3. 
 126. Connecticut, the second jurisdiction in the United States to legalize same-sex marriage, has 
followed the stages of the theory of small change, but it is unclear whether the establishment of civil 
unions had any effect on this decision.  In 2004, eight couples submitted a lawsuit to the Connecticut 
trial court, asserting that denying same-sex marriage is unconstitutional.  At the time, Connecticut 
offered only a domestic partnership registry.  While the action was pending in the trial court, the 
legislature passed a civil union law, which established the right of same-sex partners to enter into 
civil unions and conferred on them all the rights and privileges that are granted to spouses in a 
marriage.  The civil union did not satisfy the plaintiffs and they sustained the claim, asserting that 
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followed very different paths.  In fact, many states have legalized same-sex 
marriage without ever passing civil unions or following the path proscribed by 
Waaldjik.127 
Hawaii is a good example of the problems associated with the theory of 
small change and the incremental approach.  In the 1993 case of Baehr v. Lewin,128 
the Hawaiian Supreme Court became the first in the United States to recognize 
that the exclusion of same-sex marriage amounts to discrimination on the basis 
of sex.129  The Hawaiian Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court to 
examine whether the state had a compelling reason to discriminate against 
same-sex couples.  By the time the case returned to the Hawaiian Supreme 
Court, Hawaiian voters had, by an overwhelming majority of 69 percent, ratified 
a constitutional amendment in a state referendum giving the Hawaiian 
legislature the authority to amend the marriage law to apply only to opposite-
sex couples.130  Following the court’s decision, Hawaii enacted the Reciprocal 
Beneficiaries Act, which provides a limited set of rights to same-sex couples.131 
Recently, the Hawaiian State House approved a bill offering civil unions to 
same-sex couples.132  The bill, however, failed in Senate committee.133  A second 
attempt to enact civil unions succeeded but was ultimately vetoed by the 
 
the civil union law and its prohibition against same-sex marriage did not pass constitutional muster.  
Demian, Civil Unions: The Connecticut Approach, PARTNERS TASK FORCE (Nov. 21, 2009), 
http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-conn.html (discouraging couples from entering into civil 
unions); Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 101-02 (Conn. 2006).  Indeed, at the end of July 2006, only 
1072 civil unions were registered, and it does not seem that it has had a great influence on society in 
Connecticut.  The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, asserting that “the effect of [the civil union 
law] has been to create an identical set of legal rights in Connecticut for same-sex couples and 
opposite-sex couples.”  Id.  On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled by a 4-3 majority that 
denying same-sex couples the right to marry was against the equality and liberty rules in the 
Connecticut Constitution.  Connecticut, therefore, did follow the classic stages.  It is not clear, 
however, that civil unions actually contributed to the incremental process toward same-sex marriage.  
The civil unions were legislated while a court challenge was pending and, therefore, could not really 
have an effect on the process.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 
 127. A total of fifteen states had passed mini-DOMAs by the end of 1996, and at the time of this 
writing, thirty states have constitutional provisions limiting recognition of same-sex relationships, 
and several other states have amended their marriage laws for the same purpose.  See, e.g., DOMA 
WATCH, http://www.domawatch.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (“There are 30 states that have 
constitutional amendments protecting traditional marriage, including the three states (Arizona, 
California, and Florida) that passed constitutional amendments in November 2008.”). 
 128. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74 (Haw. 1993), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 
1993), aff’d sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
 129. See id. at 561-72 (The Court did not decide that withholding marriage from same-sex couples 
is unconstitutional, but rather that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples is prima facie sex 
discrimination requiring justification and therefore remanded the case to a lower court to examine 
whether the state could provide a compelling rationale.); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *15 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (In 1996, on remand, a Hawaiian state circuit court found that the State had not 
provided sufficient justification.). 
 130. MERIN, supra note 5, at 221-22. 
 131. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (1997) (providing that any two single adults who cannot get 
married have access to some state rights benefits, such as inheritance rights, the right to sue for 
wrongful death, and health and pension benefits for the partners of state employees). 
 132. H.B. 444, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2009). 
 133. Mark Niesse, Committee Deadlocks on Hawaii Same-Sex Unions Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28, 
2009, http://www.webcitation.org/5ewQDxNaq. 
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governor.134  It took Hawaii twelve years to begin discussing replacing the 
reciprocal beneficiaries scheme with civil unions, and they have not yet 
succeeded in doing so.  A review of the State House’s discussion while the bill 
was being argued makes clear that a majority of the members of the legislature, 
as well as proponents of civil unions in the general public, were primarily 
concerned with equalizing the day-to-day rights of same-sex couples but 
showed no clear desire to enhance their official status.135  Moreover, Hawaiian 
couples recently filed a lawsuit “seeking a status like civil unions” in order to 
attain rights and benefits equal to those granted to opposite sex-couples.136  The 
case of Hawaii thus shows how registered partnership schemes can impede the 
legalization of same-sex marriage by focusing efforts on the struggle for civil 
unions and putting same-sex marriage on the backburner.  Incrementalism in 
Hawaii’s case has been too slow and too gradual. 
While Vermont was the first state to enact civil unions, Massachusetts was 
the first to recognize same-sex marriage.137  Massachusetts is a prime example of 
why an incrementalist process is not always necessary.  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held in a 4-3 majority that the Massachusetts 
Constitution prohibits the state from denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry.138  When faced with the question of whether offering civil unions rather 
than marriage is constitutional, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
replied sharply that: 
Segregating same-sex unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held 
rationally to advance or “preserve” what we stated in Goodridge were the 
Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the 
conservation of resources . . . . Because the proposed law by its express terms 
forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate same-
sex couples to a different status.139 
The case of Massachusetts demonstrates that legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage can be achieved in the absence of the incremental approach.  Eskridge 
clarifies that Massachusetts “had deregulated sodomy and adopted sweeping 
antidiscrimination and hate crime laws protecting LGBT people, but each 
[Massachusetts and Vermont] had also adopted statewide domestic partnership 
regimes for state employees.”140 
I believe Eskridge overestimates the progress demonstrated in 
Massachusetts before the state’s Supreme Court decision.  Indeed, 
 
 134. Associated Press, Hawaii: Governor Vetoes Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E5DC1230F934A35754C0A9669D8B63&ref=s
ame_sex_marriage. 
 135. Testimony on H.B. 444, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2009), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ 
session2009/Testimony/HB444_TESTIMONY_JUD_02-05-09_.pdf. 
 136. Young v. Lingle, LAMBDA LEGAL (July 29, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/ 
cases/young-v-lingle.html. 
 137. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (2003) (“We declare that barring 
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that 
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004). 
 140. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 35-36 (emphasis added). 
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Massachusetts decriminalized sodomy laws and adopted antidiscrimination 
laws protecting LGB people in 1998,141 but it only offered an extremely limited 
domestic partnership registry.  An executive order signed by Governor William 
Weld in 1993 provided limited rights for a limited number of high-level 
employees: it allowed employees in same-sex relationships to register their 
partners for non-medical benefits and bereavement purposes only.142  Domestic 
partnership schemes, however, usually provide substantial rights, including 
such rights as to remain in a rent-controlled apartment after the domestic 
partner and leaseholder dies, to visit the domestic partner in a city hospital, and 
(in the case of the partners of city employees) to access subsidized health 
insurance.143 
Moreover, while several cities and towns in Massachusetts have offered a 
more expansive recognition of domestic partnership, including medical benefits, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 1999 that the City of 
Boston did not have the power to expand the reach of the state insurance laws 
by including domestic partners in the group health system.144  Although not 
directly at issue in the case, the benefits provided to domestic partners and their 
dependents by nearby towns and cities were called into question by the court’s 
ruling.145 
Therefore, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its 
decision, it had passed only the first two steps proposed by the theory of small 
change, i.e., decriminalizing sodomy and enacting antidiscrimination laws.146  
There was only minimal legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and 
Massachusetts did not offer the option of civil unions or expansive domestic 
partnership registration when the court decision was handed down.  As such, 
Massachusetts is an exception to Merin’s theory that the stage of civil unions 
always precedes legal recognition of same-sex marriage. 
This is made even clearer by the case of Iowa, a state that never had any 
civil union or domestic partnership scheme prior to the Iowa Supreme Court 
ruling that struck down the ban on same-sex marriage.147  In fact, sexual 
orientation was added to the antidiscrimination law in 2007, only two years 
prior to the aforementioned court ruling.  Thus, Iowa did not go through any 
sort of incremental process or the “necessary progress” described by the theory 
of small change. 
 
 141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 3(6) (July 1, 2003). 
 142. Mass. Exec. Order No. 340 (Nov. 19, 1993). 
 143. See N.Y. Executive Order No. 33, Establishing a State Policy Against Discrimination of the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation and Reviving a Task Force to Address Individuals’ Rights to Benefit of Government 
Services and Opportunity for Government Service Regardless of Sexual Orientation, 9 NYCRR 5.33 (1996). 
 144. See Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335, 342 (Mass. 1999) (revoking an Executive 
Order issued by Boston’s mayor which granted health insurance benefits to registered domestic 
partners of city employees). 
 145. See Jennifer L. Levi, Massachusetts’ Domestic Partnership Challenge: Hope for a Better Future, 9 
LAW & SEXUALITY 137, 149 (1999-2000). 
 146. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004 (Mass. 2003). 
 147. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009). 
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California, in contrast to other states, clearly followed incremental 
process.148  As early as 1997, the County of San Francisco enacted the Equal 
Benefits Ordinance, the first ordinance in the United States requiring certain 
private actors to recognize same-sex relationships.149  Other jurisdictions, such as 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, followed.  In 1999, California was the first state to 
enact a domestic partnership registry.150  In 2000, however, 61 percent of voters 
voted to enact a ballot initiative known as Proposition 22, adding a section to the 
California Family Code formally defining marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman.151  In October 2001, California expanded the rights of same-sex 
couples under its domestic partnership law, and in 2003, the state enacted an 
even more substantial extension.152  This process has steadily continued ever 
since, with at least one bill extending greater rights to same-sex couples passing 
every year. 
In 2004, in the wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision,153 San 
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered that county marriage licenses be 
issued “on a non-discriminatory basis, without regard to gender or sexual 
orientation.”154  This caused substantial controversy, and the Supreme Court of 
California subsequently voided the marriages, ruling unanimously that the 
mayor had overstepped his authority by issuing licenses to same-sex couples.155  
Following this case, LGB organizations challenged the constitutionality of the 
marriage law. 156  In September 2005, while the California court heard the case, 
the California legislature approved a bill legalizing same-sex marriage, making 
it the first state in the nation to approve a same-sex marriage bill without court 
intervention.  Unfortunately, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the 
bill.157 
In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution.  While the court was still 
considering the case, opponents of same-sex marriage brought forth a ballot 
initiative proposing an amendment to California’s constitution: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”  This 
proposal, commonly known as Proposition 8, was accepted in the 2008 election 
by 52.3 percent of the vote.  The validation of the amendment was almost 
immediately challenged in the California Supreme Court, which upheld the 
amendment but also validated the marriages of the almost 30,000 same-sex 
 
 148. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 115 (stating that California was “the only state with 
comparable protection for lesbians and gay men.”). 
 149. MERIN, supra note 5, at 202. 
 150. Id. 
 151. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 152. Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2586 (West 
2005). 
 153. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003-04 (Mass. 2003). 
 154. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384. 
 157. Nancy Vogel & Jordan Rau, Gov. Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, 
http://www.latimes.com/la-me-timelinegaymarriage-2005sep30,0,1040616.story. 
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couples who had already married.158  More recently, however, the Northern 
District of California overturned Proposition 8, ruling that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.159  The case is 
currently under appeal.160 
A few explanations were given for the victory of Proposition 8.  One of the 
popular explanations was that the candidacy of Barack Obama affected the 
results.  Those in support of this claim argue that African American and Latino 
voters, who traditionally oppose same-sex marriage, showed up at the polls in 
great numbers in support of President Obama and, while there, voted for 
Proposition 8.161  This belief, however, cannot fully account for the passage of 
Proposition 8.  To be sure, while 70 percent of California’s African American 
voters did vote yes on Proposition 8,162 a study shows that the initiative would 
still have passed, albeit barely, even if African American and Latin voters had 
shown up in the same numbers as they had for the 2004 elections.163  Others 
suggest that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ donation of 
approximately twenty million dollars in support of the amendment assisted the 
passage of the proposition.164  Still others blame gay rights organizations for 
failing to effectively publicize the lack of rights experienced by LGB couples.165 
Whatever the reason, the victory of Proposition 8 led to the realization that 
there are important and unpredictable factors influencing the path to legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.  These factors have significant influence on 
the ultimate acceptance of same-sex marriage—perhaps as much as or more 
than the incremental process.  The case of California demonstrates the 
aforementioned concept of the butterfly effect.166  When it comes to same-sex 
 
 158. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). 
 159. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 264 F.R.D. 576, 584 (N.D.Cal. 2009). 
 160. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (ordering the district 
court’s judgment stayed pending appeal). 
 161. See Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Is Tied to Obama Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/us/politics/21gay.html. 
 162. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Eight Is Enough, NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, http:// 
www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/12/01/081201taco_talk_hertzberg. 
 163. Marisa Abrajano, Are Blacks and Latinos Responsible for the Passage of Proposition 8?  Analyzing 
Voter Attitudes on California’s Proposal to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in 2008, 63 POL. RES. Q. 922, 929 (2010) 
(“[E]ven if turnout rates among these two groups remained at the same levels as they did in the 2004 
presidential race, Proposition 8 still would have garnered a majority of support from California’s 
voters.  Nonetheless, given their large share of the state’s eligible voting population (31 percent), 
black and Latino voters played an important role in the passage of Proposition 8.”). 
 164. Cf. Mark Schoofs, Mormons Boost Antigay Marriage Effort, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122186063716658279.html. 
 165. See Matthew Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271 
.html. 
 166. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “black swan” theory offers a different way of looking at the often 
unpredictable nature of same-sex marriage.  NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE 
IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2d ed. 2010).  According to this theory, a black swan is an 
historical event, an outlier, that comes as a surprise to the observer, has consequences on human 
lives, and is explained retrospectively.  Id. at xxi-xxiii.  Such events include the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks; World War I; and the meteoric success of a book.  One interesting observation made 
by Taleb is that a black swan event is often analyzed and rationalized in the aftermath of the event, 
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marriage, it is hard to foresee what seemingly small factors will have great 
influence on the final outcome. 167  California also provides striking proof of the 
fact that when it comes to marriage, change is never a small matter. 
Maryland offers a more complicated picture regarding same-sex marriage, 
though this picture demonstrates the point that there are many paths leading to 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  Maryland passed through the first two stages 
of the theory of small change168 and came close to arriving at the final stage of 
 
leading people to assume that it should have been possible to predict the event.  That was the case 
with the terrorist attacks: people looked back and argued that it should have been possible to 
prevent it, that the data needed to prevent the event were there.  But according to Taleb, such an 
event can be “predicted” only in retrospect, because people’s minds are not trained to deal with 
black swans.  Human nature makes people think in hindsight of an event that it could have been 
predicted beforehand.  Taleb explains that “black swan” is an objective issue and that it is 
appropriate to deal with it with empirical skepticism—on the one hand by using data, and on the 
other hand by remembering that there are many things beyond our knowledge that could affect our 
conclusions.  Id. at 145-57.  That is why, according to Taleb, people should be cautious about 
interpreting scientific theories that give good explanations for events that have already transpired, 
because in fact they lead us to fail to consider factors of which we are not aware.  They provide us 
with the illusion of knowledge and inflated confidence, thus catalyzing the next black swan.  Id. at 
137-45.  Applying this idea to the predictability of same-sex marriage demonstrates that LGB 
organizations should avoid assuming that everything—the outcome of a court case or a lobbying 
effort, for example—can be known in advance.  A case like Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which challenged 
the ban on same-sex marriage in California, could, in the end, be determined by the composition of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, sudden changes to which are not common.  As stated by Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky, “The question is whether it’s too soon to risk that the court will reject it.  We don’t 
know who’s going to be on the court.”  Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal Expert Concerned 
by Fed Prop 8 Case, THE ADVOCATE, May 27, 2009, http://www.advocate.com/Politics/ 
Marriage_Equality/Legal_Experts_Outraged_by_Federal_Prop__8_Case. 
 167. The case of Perry  v. Schwarzenegger also “illustrated how the politics of litigation can operate 
in unpredictable ways.”  See Nan Hunter, Ninth Circuit Sends Prop 8 Standing Issue to California 
Supreme Court, Jan. 4, 2011, HUNTER JUST. (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:50 PM),  
http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com/hunter_of_justice/2011/01/ninth-circuit-sends-prop-8-
standing-issue-to-california-supreme-court.html.  After the trial court concluded that the ban on 
same-sex marriage in California violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution, California’s governor and attorney general refused to represent the appellants on 
appeal.  Therefore, the appellant may lack standing to appeal.  To resolve the question of standing, 
the Ninth Circuit decided to let the California Supreme Court determine whether proponents of 
Prop 8 have standing to pursue the case.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 9633 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 
2011) (order certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California).  Judge Reinhardt, a very 
progressive judge, wrote a separate concurrence in which he criticized the lawyers on both sides for 
choosing litigation strategies that created the standing problem.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 
9576 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (Reinhart, J. concurring).  Specifically, he criticized Boise and Olson, the 
lawyers representing the opponents of Prop 8, because “the issues concerning standing [would have 
been] wholly avoidable in this case” if they had filed a lawsuit against a broader set of defendants.  
Id. at *7.  Judge Reinhardt is a pro-gay-rights judge as well as “a sharp critic of how procedural 
issues like standing can erect obstacles to a court reaching the merits of a case.”  Hunter, supra.  
Hunter therefore concludes that “the politics of litigation can operate in unpredictable ways,” and 
that “[t]he only thing certain about the impact of today’s rulings is that the progress of the case has 
considerably slowed down.”  Id.  Hence, she suggests that the cases concerning the constitutionality 
of DOMA at the federal level may arrive at the U.S. Supreme Court faster than this case.  Id.  In other 
words, there are a number of different factors that affect the path to legal recognition of same-sex 
partnerships—judges, litigation strategies, and other court cases that are adjudicated at the same 
time. 
 168. Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-1059, 1998 WL 965992, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 
1998) (holding that “the statute as it is written does not encompass consensual, non-commercial, 
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legalizing same-sex marriage when the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, 
by a 4-3 split, the lower court’s decision that the ban on same-sex marriage 
violated the state constitution.169 
Even though the Maryland case may be construed as a failure for LGB 
organizations, it stimulated the passage of domestic partnership legislation.170  
Recently, Maryland’s Attorney General also announced that the state will 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.171  In several ways, the 
situation in Maryland illustrates the complexity that can characterize the path to 
same-sex marriage.  First, the fact that three justices were ready to accept the 
argument that banning same-sex marriage is unconstitutional indicates that it is 
possible that Maryland could have moved directly to allowing same-sex 
marriage, bypassing the other stages of the theory of small change.  Second, at 
least according to Merin, it is a fundamental mistake to go to court to ask for 
marriage equality before all the preceding “necessary” steps have been 
completed.  Nevertheless, despite the failure to procure same-sex marriage 
rights in Maryland, this court decision did stimulate the enactment of a domestic 
partnership law. 
New York presents a different path.  Eskridge predicted that New York 
would be one of the first states to “follow Vermont and create an institution for 
same-sex couples.”172  Although his prediction was correct, it did so in a unique 
way.  In Hernandez v. Robles, New York’s Court of Appeals, the state’s highest 
court, held that the ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional because there are 
rational grounds on which the legislature could choose to restrict marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.173  Recently, however, the Appellate Division, Fourth 
Judicial Department of New York determined that this ruling does not preclude 
recognition of same-sex marriages that are performed in Canada.174  Following 
this decision, New York Governor David Paterson issued a memo to state 
agencies calling on them to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 
states.175  As evidenced by the steps taken in New York, whose Senate recently 
rejected a same-sex marriage bill,176 the path to same-sex marriage is usually 
more complicated than that described by the theory of small change and 
involves more than three stages. 
 
heterosexual or homosexual activity between adults in private”); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-
602 (LexisNexis 2009) (Maryland’s antidiscrimination law outlaws discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
 169. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007). 
 170. 2008 Md. Laws 4597. 
 171. See Associated Press, Gay Marriage Makes Gain in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24 2010, at A21, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/us/25marriage.html. 
 172. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 233. 
 173. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2006). 
 174. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 175. Martinez v. County of Monroe et al. (Seeking Recognition in New York for Valid Same-Sex 
Marriages Performed Outside the State), NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http:// www.nyclu.org/ 
node/1088 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 176. See Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/nyregion/03marriage.html. 
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There are many other exceptions to this theory.  Maine, for example, 
enacted domestic partnership laws in 2004 but did not add sexual orientation as 
a protected category to its antidiscrimination law until 2005.177  In New Jersey, 
the legislature enacted a civil union scheme in 2006 after its Supreme Court 
decision in Lewis v. Harris178 but recently voted down a same-sex marriage bill.179  
A change in legal status is not likely to come soon, as Governor Chris Christie 
opposes same-sex marriage.180  Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused 
to hear a case challenging the constitutionality of offering only same-sex couples 
the option of civil unions, which again shows that civil unions may not catalyze 
progress but may actually impede it.181 
In conclusion, the survey of the American legal situation shows some 
similarities to the European one.  It mainly demonstrates that the incremental 
approach is not always the solution, and that there are a variety of factors that 
affect the path to same-sex marriage.  The theory of small change overlooks this 
multitude of factors.  A survey of the different patterns leading to legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships in Europe and the United States 
demonstrates that the process described by the theory of small change is not 
accurate and does not allow for the complexities inherent in the struggle to 
achieve legalization of same-sex marriage.  The landscape does not show that 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage is inevitable.  Many countries and states 
seem to be reluctant to move beyond the stage of civil unions, while others have 
constitutional bans prohibiting same-sex marriage.  Furthermore, the courts of 
some of these countries and states have gone so far as to interpret existing 
constitutional provisions as prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
Now that it has been demonstrated that the theory of small change is not 
able to accurately predict the legalization of same-sex marriage, I will consider 
whether Badgett’s method offers a better framework. 
 
 177. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (Supp. 2009).  Moreover, the case of Maine also suggests 
that the granting of marriage rights by the legislature does not make a state immune to the problems 
associated with legalization of same-sex marriage by the court.  The fact that the legislature grants 
such rights does not preclude the possibility that those rights will be revoked by the people in a 
referendum.  In Maine, a same-sex marriage bill was approved by the legislature and signed into law 
by the Governor in 2009.  Nevertheless, opponents successfully petitioned for a referendum on the 
issue, putting the new law on hold before it came into effect; the referendum was approved by 53 
percent of voters, preventing the new law from ever going into effect.  Abby Goodnough, A Setback 
in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/us/politics/05maine.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=maine+same-
sex+marriage&st=nyt. 
 178. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
 179. See David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, 
at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Associated Press, New Jersey Supreme Court Declines Gay Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 
27, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/nyregion/27jersey.html?ref 
=same_sex_marriage. 
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V. BADGETT’S EMPIRICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTING THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Badgett offers important criticism of Eskridge’s and Waaldijk’s theories.182  
First, she argues that the theory of small change “impl[ies] the inevitability of 
change,” while history actually suggests that progress in promoting tolerance 
toward homosexuality has not been linear.183  In addition, the theory offers no 
clear idea of how long each stage of the process should or will take.  Second, 
each stage fosters compromise—a consolation prize—rather than a concrete step 
in the direction of change.  She uses as an example Denmark, which in 1989 
became the first country in the world to offer same-sex couples the option of 
registered partnerships but has not yet achieved legal acceptance of same-sex 
marriage.184  Finally, Badgett suggests that the theory of small change seems to 
be a strategic plan for LGB organizations rather “than the inexorable process as 
presented by Waaldijk and by Eskridge.”185  This notion of building on the 
previous successes of the LGB movement fails to take into account many 
important social, historical, and political factors not directly related to LGB 
politics, such as changes in family structure and other social components. 186  She 
posits that there are many factors affecting the acceptance of same-sex marriage.  
Such factors include attitudes about homosexuality, the power of LGB 
organizations, and the power of opponents of same-sex marriage.  Additionally, 
local ideological attitudes, such as liberalism, also play an important role.187  
Badgett also asserts that the legal institution of marriage promotes efficiency at 
the societal and family levels, and that this might affect the path to legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships in various ways.  For example, if marriage 
provides economic benefits, same-sex couples will have greater material 
incentive to seek some form of recognition offering the same benefits. 
Badgett suggests an alternative approach to understanding the expansion 
of marriage rights to include same-sex couples based on “theoretical and 
empirical work on institutions in economics, political science and sociology.”188  
She argues that an examination of the European countries that provide some 
form of recognition may shed light on the factors that explain why and where 
legal change occurs.  She suggests two different methods, which produce 
consistent findings, for identifying these factors.  The first method, based on a 
quantitative regression analysis, stipulates that laws recognizing same-sex 
 
 182. In her article, “Predicting Partnership Rights,” supra note 8, Badgett refers only to Waaldijk’s 
and Eskridge’s theories, while in her newest book, When Gay People Get Married: What Happens When 
Societies Legalize Same-Sex Marriage she also refers to Merin’s theory.  Badgett, supra note 8; M.V. LEE 
BADGETT, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 177 (2009). 
 183. Badgett, supra note 8, at 75. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 75-76; BADGETT, supra note 182, 175-99 (using the same method to examine whether 
change regarding recognition of same-sex relationships is too fast for the political climate or the 
public’s will). 
 187. M.V. Lee Badgett, Variations on an Equitable Theme: Explaining International Same-Sex Partner 
Recognition Laws, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 97. 
 188. Badgett, supra note 8, at 76. 
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partnerships are found in countries with high rates of cohabiting opposite-sex 
couples, more tolerant attitudes toward LGB people, higher social expenditures, 
and greater visibility and density of LGB organizations.  The second method, a 
qualitative comparative analysis, shows that countries providing some kind of 
legal recognition to same-sex couples tend to have a low level of religiosity, a 
high rate of cohabiting opposite-sex couples, and high tolerance toward the LGB 
community.189  Badgett uses the factors obtained through the second method, 
however, because it finds two important factors—lower levels of religiosity and 
the presence of a left-leaning government—to be statistically meaningful.190  
Badgett utilizes these three factors (low level of religiosity, a high rate of 
cohabiting opposite-sex couples, and high tolerance toward the LGB 
community) to examine the current situation in the United States and determine 
which states are most likely to legally recognize same-sex partnerships and 
when.  Essentially, Badgett’s research method assigns each state a score ranging 
from zero to three.191  The higher the score, the more likely it is that a state will 
recognize same-sex partnerships in the near future.192 
The legalization of same-sex marriage in Iowa demonstrates the 
inadequacy of Badgett’s theory, which assigns Iowa only two of a possible three 
points.  According to her theory, states with three points (such as Alaska, 
Florida, Arizona, and Maryland) should have recognized same-sex partnerships 
before Iowa.  This was not the case, however.  Similarly, two states that provide 
full legal recognition to same-sex couples in the form of civil unions, such as 
New Jersey193 and Illinois, received only two points, while some states that 
received three points, such as Delaware and Florida, offer no recognition of 
same-sex relationships. 
Badgett’s argument exhibits five main shortcomings.  First, her method 
does not draw significantly different conclusions than those drawn by 
Waaldjiik’s and Eskridge’s theories.  Tellingly, she concludes that her method 
“might be at least as relevant” as the theory of small change.194  Although one of 
her main criticisms is that the incremental approach does not explain why some 
 
 189. Id. at 81. 
 190. Id. at 77-78. 
 191. Id. at 82. 
 192. States that received three points were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  States that received two 
points were Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Wyoming.  States that received one point were Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.  Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,  
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia all 
received zero points.  Id. at 87-88 tbl. 2. 
 193. Badgett recognizes that her prediction regarding New Jersey was incorrect.  Id. at 82 (“Like 
the building-on-success models, the conditions-for-change framework predicts six out of seven 
states with existing partnership laws, with New Jersey the exception this time because of its 
relatively low rate of heterosexual cohabitation.”).  The other examples I mention—Iowa and 
Illinois—could not have been recognized as exceptions because these developments occurred after 
Badgett’s research was published. 
 194. Id. at 84. 
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countries have progressed faster than others,195 she too provides no clear 
explanation in quantifiable terms.  Rather, she simply lists factors that should be 
added to the theory of small change196 but falls short in proving in any way that 
these factors enhance the accuracy of the theory’s predictions. 
Second, Badgett’s method does not distinguish between same-sex marriage 
and registered partnerships.  It is important to emphasize that Badgett, as the 
title of her article (“Predicting Partnership Rights,” rather than “Predicting 
Same-Sex Marriage”) suggests, attempts to predict only some kind of legal 
recognition of same-sex couples (which might take the form of domestic 
partnerships or civil unions)— not the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  
She does not provide any predictions or explanations with regard to why one 
state permits same-sex marriage while another allows only civil unions.  The 
theory’s inability to see marriage as a distinct legal category significantly lessens 
the value of her argument.  Indeed, as I shall discuss in greater detail infra, 
marriage in the United States holds vastly more significance and is much more 
complex than domestic partnership and civil unions.  Therefore, Badgett’s 
method cannot help explain, for instance, why Nevada (three points) has opted 
for registered partnerships while Massachusetts (also three points) has legalized 
same-sex marriage. 
Third, Badgett attempts to predict the recognition of same-sex partnership 
through empirical analysis, but this method has been shown to be inaccurate 
and tends to oversimplify the debate.  To begin with, the data Badgett uses is 
imprecise.  For instance, to examine levels of religiosity, she calculates “the 
proportion of the state’s population who are adherents of evangelical 
churches.”197  It is clear that basing estimations of the level of religiosity solely 
on this type of data misses the mark.  Are non-evangelical Christians and 
members of other religions necessarily more likely to support the recognition of 
same-sex relationships? 
We may answer this question by looking at the state of Utah.  According to 
Badgett, the average percentage of evangelicals in the fifty states is 14.5 
percent.198  In Utah, only 1.9 percent of citizens are members of an evangelical 
church, less than in Massachusetts.199  However, Utah is known for being one of 
the most religiously conservative states in the United States, with approximately 
58 percent of its adult inhabitants claiming membership in the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, one of the most prominent opponents of same-sex 
marriage.200  Under Badgett’s method, Utah actually received the highest score 
 
 195. Id. at 75 (“[T]he incrementalists offer no clear idea about how long each incremental step 
should or will take.”). 
 196. Id. at 76-78. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 87; BADGETT, supra note 182, at 197. 
 199. Badgett, supra note 8, at 87; BADGETT, supra note 182, at 197. 
 200. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 99 (2008), 
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf; see also Frank 
Newport, Mormons Most Conservative Major Religious Group in U.S., GALLUP  (Jan 11, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/125021/Mormons-Conservative-Major-Religious-Group.aspx 
(“Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or Mormons, are the most 
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possible in this category, indicating a low level of religiousness that the State 
does not possess in reality.201 
Fourth, the factors suggested by Badgett can lead to consequences other 
than legal recognition of same-sex couples.  In France, for example, a high 
tolerance toward homosexuality (one of the factors she mentions) has led to a 
very weak LGB movement.  The French LGB movement has not been “militant, 
and [has] looked only for limited improvements in the situation.”202  The 
relatively comfortable legal and social condition of the LGB community “partly 
explains the lack of militant movements and the individualism of French 
homosexuals.”203  And, as Badgett herself recognizes, the power and visibility of 
the LGB movement is one of the important factors influencing the achievement 
of the recognition of same-sex partnerships.204 
Fifth, in applying the principles abstracted from the European experience, 
Badgett disregards her own warning that “[t]ransferring political lessons and 
experiences from one continent to another runs the risk of ignoring important 
cultural or social differences between countries and continents.”205  For instance, 
Badgett’s method does not account for the fact that the unique legal culture and 
political philosophy of many European countries may affect these countries’ 
paths to the legalization of same-sex marriage.206  Such differences among 
jurisdictions call into question the benefit such comparisons may provide.  This 
 
conservative major religious group in the country, with 59 [percent] identifying as conservative, 31 
[percent] as moderate, and 8 [percent] as liberal.”). 
 201. Badgett, supra note 8, at 88 tbl. 2 (indicating that 1.9 percent of Utah’s population belongs to 
an evangelical church).  Similarly, in Rhode Island, a state that “does not recognize gay marriage, 
partly owing to opposition from Roman Catholic church leaders in the most heavily Catholic state in 
the country,” only 1.6 percent of the population is evangelical, which gives it the lowest level of 
religiosity in the United States according to Badgett’s data.  Rhode Island Lawmakers Back Same-Sex 
Couples Rights to Plan Funerals, FOX NEWS, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/ politics/2010/01/ 
05/rhode-island-lawmakers-sex-couples-rights-plan-funerals#ixzz18tcPa3w9. 
 202. 2 FLORENCE TAMAGNE, A HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN EUROPE 267 (2004). 
 203. Id. at 305. 
 204. Badgett, supra note 8, at 77. 
 205. Id. at 85. 
 206. There are differences in the perceptions of the role of the court in countries governed by 
civil law and the United States.  For example, in France the courts have traditionally not been 
political and it is therefore understood that they should not intervene in the work of legislatures.  In 
ancient France, law courts, known as the Parlements, often assumed a legislative role by protecting 
royal decisions in order to defend the privileges of the social classes to which the judges belonged.  
As a result, the French Revolution fostered a negative view of judges legislating from the bench.  
This was reflected in the Napoleonic Code, which prohibited judges from passing judgments 
exceeding the scope of the matter being judged.  In theory, this is the reason that there is no case law 
in France: judges were simply to decide the case they heard rather than try to establish precedents.  
However, the courts still had to fill gaps in the laws.  As a result, a large body of jurisprudence was 
born, principally in the Conseil d’État.  However, a judicial decision still cannot be based solely on a 
previous decision.  There is also a very limited form of judicial review in France: the Constitutional 
Council can review legislation on constitutional grounds, but only in the period between passage of 
a bill and signing by the President, and only on a referral by the authorized people (the President, 
for example).  Once the law is signed, it cannot be repealed by the court.  The judges on the 
Constitutional Council serve for only nine years.  Charles de Gaulle explicitly rejected the American 
idea of a Supreme Court, which he regarded as a form of “government by judges.”  In a democracy, 
he reportedly said, “the only supreme court is the people.”  See JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 30-36 (1985); CATHERINE ELLIOTT ET AL., FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 135-40 (2d ed. 2006). 
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critique is also relevant to the theory of small change’s failure to consider the 
unique characteristics of each country and the way such attributes influence the 
national debate over same-sex marriage. 207 
For example, the way the French Republic defines citizenship affects the 
country’s same-sex marriage debate perhaps more than any other factor.  At the 
heart of the French debate are the roles of republic itself and the important 
concept of universalism—the oneness, the sameness, of all individuals.208  
According to French universalism, that sameness is the basis for equality.  That 
equality is achieved by making one’s social, religious, sexual orientation, and 
any other “origins” irrelevant in the public sphere.209  France insists on 
assimilation to a singular culture: the embrace of shared language, history, and 
political ideology.  Under this concept, individual rights are secondary; the 
republic comes first.  Universalist ideals are evident in the unique nature of the 
pacte civil de solidarité as an institution that is open to both same- and opposite-
sex couples.  The American perception of individual rights and citizenship, 
however, falls at the other end of the spectrum.  Mary Ann Glendon argues that 
Americans use “rights talk”—a tendency to convert social controversies into a 
clash of rights that sets it apart from other Western democracies.210 
 In conclusion, while Badgett offers an important and valid critique, her 
proposed method does not, and cannot, address a number of important political 
and philosophical concepts and does not provide a reliable means of predicting 
legal recognition of same-sex couples.  It is clear that the social, cultural, 
economic, philosophical, legal, and historical factors at play are so numerous 
that such predictions are impossible.  In the next Part, I offer a suggestion as to 
why the theory of small change fails to accurately predict or explain the way 
social change regarding same-sex marriage occurs. 
VI. WHY A CHANGE TO MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES IS NEVER SMALL 
The basic assumption of the theory of small change is that a correlation 
exists between the first two stages and the ultimate legalization of same-sex 
marriage.  The theory assumes that recognition of same-sex marriage by a state 
will necessarily follow a repeal of sodomy laws and the addition of sexual 
orientation as a protected category to antidiscrimination laws. 
As I have shown, the theory of small change does not conform to the 
reality.  The reason for this is that the three stages described by the theory are 
materially and normatively different.  I argue that the two rationales 
underpinning the theory of small change—i.e., (1) that each step improves the 
 
 207. An additional factor that might affect the struggle for same-sex marriage in the United 
States, but is not relevant to the situation in Europe, is the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy.  This policy change will allow LGB people who serve in the army to argue that if they 
fight for their country, they should have the right to enjoy all the rights and benefits associated with 
marriage, including the right to marry.  Such an argument can make the argument for the 
legalization of marriage stronger and may induce recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
 208. ENDA MCCAFFREY, THE GAY REPUBLIC: SEXUALITY, CITIZENSHIP AND SUBVERSION IN FRANCE 
15-20 (2005). 
 209. JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 11 (2008). 
 210. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1993). 
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societal condition of LGB people and brings them closer to same-sex marriage 
and (2) that the legalization of marriage is perceived as a small change once all 
previous steps have been taken—are wrong.  I contend that there is a substantial 
difference between the right to not be prosecuted for engaging in homosexual 
sex or the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
the right to marry generally and the right to marry a person of the same sex 
specifically.  Societal acceptance of LGB rights does not necessarily mean 
acceptance of same-sex marriage, because the rights at stake are often perceived 
as so different that adoption of one of does not necessarily lead to the adoption 
of others.  In light of the importance of the institution and concept of marriage in 
American society, any attempted change will not be perceived as “small,” 
regardless of the events that may precede it.  Perhaps in the Netherlands the 
legalization of same-sex marriage was a small change, but this is not the case in 
the United States, where marriage is oft perceived solely as a phenomenon of 
opposite-sex partnership blessed by God and is undergirded by an historical 
legacy based on societal beliefs.211  As Nancy Cott, an expert on the history of 
marriage, argues: 
From the founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions about 
the importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply 
implanted in public policy, sprouting repeatedly as the nation took over the 
continent and established terms for the inclusions and exclusion of new 
citizens.212 
The meaning of marriage in the Netherlands, one of the most secular 
nations in the world, is very different from its meaning in the United States, 
where marriage has great religious significance.213  “Marriage is like the 
[S]phinx,” writes Cott, “a conspicuous and recognizable monument on the 
landscape, full of secrets.”214  A change to such an institution in American 
society cannot be perceived as small.  Consider, for example, the recent 
statement of American Evangelical Pastor Rick Warren: 
I support full equal rights for everybody in America.  I don’t believe we should 
have unequal rights depending on particular lifestyles so I fully support equal 
rights. . . [But] nowhere in the constitution can you find the “right” to claim that 
 
 211. See René König, Sociological Introduction, 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 39 (Aleck Chloros ed., 1974)  (“[M]an’s ideas concerning the topic of love-and-marriage are 
much more diverse and flexible than the structure of the family.  While notions concerning love and 
marriage often change with fashion, the family, as a universal human institution, is not so easily 
changed.”). 
 212. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1 (2000). 
 213. A recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center compared perceptions and rates of 
marriage between the United States and Europe and found that “Americans have a unique 
relationship with marriage.  Compared with most other western nations, the U.S. has one of the 
highest marriage rates as well as one of the highest divorce rates.” See The Decline of Marriage and Rise 
of New Families, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 18, 2010), http://pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-
decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2; see also SPECIAL EUROBARAOMETER: SOCIAL VALUES, 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ 
ebs_225_report_en.pdf (indicating that only 34 percent of Dutch survey respondents said they 
believe in God). 
 214. COTT, supra note 214, at 3. 
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any loving relationship [is] identical to marriage.  It’s just not there.  I’m not 
opposed to that [same-sex marriage] as much as I’m opposed to redefinition of a 
5,000 year definition of marriage.215 
Warren’s statement indicates a special resistance to opening the institution 
of marriage to same-sex couples, even though he accepts that LGB people 
deserve equal rights.  Similarly, when deciding that sodomy laws targeting 
adults engaging in consensual sex were unconstitutional, United States Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that there is a difference between 
granting the right to engage in homosexual sex and granting individuals the 
right to marry a member of the same sex: 
[The case] does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.  The case 
does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, 
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.216 
Polls indicate a substantial difference between the percentage of people 
who support decriminalizing sodomy or adding sexual orientation as a 
protected category in antidiscrimination laws and the percentage of people who 
support same-sex marriage.217  In fact, every proposed ballot initiative to ban 
same-sex marriage has thus far been successful.218  What accounts for these vast 
differences between attitudes toward the repeal of sodomy laws, the enactment 
of antidiscrimination laws, and legalization of same-sex marriage? 
There are several likely explanations.  Society views the rights 
encompassed by each stage of the theory of small change differently.  In 
Hohfeldian terms,219 we can argue that having the right to engage in a same-sex 
act, and not to be the target of discriminated based on sexual orientation, is a 
sort of claim while the “right” to marry is a sort of liberty or privilege.220  
Indeed, in Zablocki v. Redhail,221 Justice Stewart cites Hohfeld in a concurring 
opinion to support his claim that he does “not agree with the Court that there is 
 
 215. Rick Warren’s Controversial Comments on Gay Marriage, BELIEFNET (Dec. 17, 2008, 4:20 PM), 
http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/12/rick-warrens-controversial-com.html. 
 216. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
 217. See Paul R. Brewer & Clyde Wilcox, The Polls—Trends: Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions, 69 
PUB. OPINION Q. 599, 600 (2005).  
 218. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Option Four: A Compromise on Gay Marriage, NAT’L REV., June 6, 2005, 
at 38, 39, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216805/option-four/ramesh-
ponnuru (“[V]oters supported initiatives against same-sex marriage in every state where they were 
on the ballot.”).  In Arizona, a ballot initiative did not pass in 2006, but succeeded in 2008. 
 219. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913) (dividing “rights” into eight categories: right versus no-rights, 
privilege versus duty, power versus disability, immunity versus liability [jural opposites], right 
versus duty, privilege versus no-right, power versus liability, and immunity versus disability [jural 
correlatives]). 
 220. See generally Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt: Hohfeldian 
Analysis of Constitutional Law, 61 S.C. L. REV.  141 (2010) (explaining how to interpret constitutional 
rights in Hohfeldian terms). 
 221. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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a ‘right to marry’ in the constitutional sense.”222  Rather this is, for Justice 
Stewart, “more accurately” described as a “privilege.”223 
The right to not be discriminated against in work and accommodations and 
the right to marriage hold important practical and symbolic meaning, but 
freedom from the possibility of criminal charges or imprisonment is 
significantly more fundamental.  It is not a coincidence that in criminal cases the 
burden of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt, while a preponderance of 
the evidence is the standard required in most civil cases.  Freedom from criminal 
prosecution is more basic from a rights point of view than the right to 
employment or marriage. 
The right to engage in homosexual acts is part of the notion of privacy that 
is itself rooted in the American legal system.224  The idea of privacy rights 
originates in classical liberal principles based on the value of individual 
freedom, as expressed in John Stuart Mill’s classic statement of the harm 
principle.225  According to Mill’s theory, a person is free to act as he or she 
wishes, so long as no one else is harmed.  The possibility of creating good 
outcomes does not justify state action; only the possibility of preventing harm 
provides such justification.  For all other activities, individuals retain “the right 
to be let alone.”226  The right to do whatever one wants in one’s own private 
domain amounts to the right to be let alone.227 
Engaging in homosexual sex could traditionally be perceived as a negative 
right to be let alone, while marriage demands more than just being let alone.228  
Some scholars see the right to marry as a negative right, as opposed to an 
affirmative entitlement to state-sanctioned marriage.229  Nevertheless, marriage 
is not a clear-cut negative right; rather, it is a legal institution that requires the 
official recognition and sanction of the state.230  Further, many legal rights and 
 
 222. Id. at 392.  But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) 
(Greaney, J., concurring) (“The right to marry is not a privilege conferred by the State, but a 
fundamental right that is protected against unwarranted State interference.”). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 280 (1986).  But see Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 478 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding no 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sex). 
 225. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-15 (Emery Neff ed., 1926). 
 226. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 227. Cf. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 724 (1999) (“The liberal 
conception of private choice is the idea that government ought to promote interests in decisional 
privacy, chiefly by allowing individuals, families, and other nongovernmental entities to make 
many, though not all, of the most important decisions concerning friendship, sex, marriage, 
reproduction, religion, and political association.”). 
 228. But see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS 
ON TAXES 48 (1999) (arguing that all rights must be positive because they all depend on an agent of 
government for their enforcement). 
 229. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL 69 (2006) (“The Court’s marriage 
jurisprudence therefore does not conceptualize the right to marry as an affirmative entitlement to a 
state-sanctioned marriage.  Rather, the right to marry is best conceptualized as a negative right . . . 
.”). 
 230. Therefore, Mill himself did not think that polygamy should be criminalized, but rather 
believed that the state should not recognize polygamous marriage.  ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 
7, at 220. 
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benefits come with it.  Therefore, while the decriminalization of homosexual sex 
seems to restore a basic right and does not require even minimal effort from the 
government, marriage demands at the very least a certificate, a judge, and state 
registration.  While most people agree that the right to marry is part of 
decisional privacy, and that marriage is a private relationship, it is also accepted 
that the state may interfere with this right by imposing age restrictions, 
prohibiting polygamy, etc.231  Marriage does not happen solely in the private 
sphere, as it is a legal institution that always requires public affirmation: 
To be marriage, the institution requires public affirmation.  It requires public 
knowledge—at least some publicity beyond the couple themselves; that is why 
witnesses are required for the ceremony and why wedding bells ring.  More 
definitively, legal marriage requires state sanction, in the license and the 
ceremony.232 
The right to marry is also different from the right not to be discriminated 
against, and the fact that a person, a government, or a society chooses to protect 
a LGB person from discrimination does not lead to the conclusion that the same 
entity will be open to legalizing same-sex marriage.  Antidiscrimination laws are 
not as basic as the right to privacy in order to engage in homosexual acts.  
However, it is generally understood that antidiscrimination laws are an essential 
part of a just society and thus validate the burden they might place on some 
employers or society as a whole.233  Indeed, “[a]nti-discrimination laws are not 
designed to protect majority views; they are written for protection of the 
minority, even if generally unpopular.”234  The basic idea is to protect people 
from the indignities of prejudicial mistreatment.235 
The differences between public perceptions of antidiscrimination laws and 
of same-sex marriage are well illustrated by the following example.  When the 
Senate voted on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),236 many of its members 
also pushed for the passage of the Employment Nondiscrimination Act,237 which 
would provide protection to LGB individuals in employment.  This, the Senate 
 
 231. See Allen, supra note 227, at 727 (“Marriage is considered a private relationship, yet 
governments require licenses and medical tests, impose age limits, and prohibit polygamous, 
incestuous, and same-sex marriages.”).  Of course, the state also imposes some limitations on the 
right to engage in certain sexual acts, such as incest, but such cases are often punished after the event 
rather than prevented from occurring. 
 232. COTT, supra note 214, at 1-2. 
 233. See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-discrimination Laws, 9 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 145, 147 (2000); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. 
REV. 751 (1991) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws are of little assistance in combating broader 
patterns of socioeconomic disadvantage on the basis of race and sex). 
 234. Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1, 19 (2008). 
 235. Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in 
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 19 (Robert C. Post 
et al. eds., 2001). 
 236. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2000), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
 237. Senate Vote on Passage: S. 2056 [104th]: Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s1996-281 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). 
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thought, would be a way to show support for the LGB community while also 
supporting DOMA.238  The Employment Nondiscrimination Act fell just one 
vote short of passage in the Senate, while DOMA was passed by a margin of 85-
14. 
It is easy for society to accept negative rights as natural.239  Sodomy laws 
fall rather comfortably under the banner of sexual privacy, a negative liberal 
concept, while same-sex marriage seems significantly more advanced and 
affirmative.240  Antidiscrimination laws protect a person’s basic rights and prove 
to be much less controversial than same-sex marriage.241  Marriage requires 
affirmative acceptance—far more investment than a demand simply to be let 
alone or not to be discriminated against based on sexual orientation.242 
One may argue that my analysis does not refute the basic assumption of the 
theory of small change, which contends that the more society progresses, the 
more LGB people are accepted and consequently the more the idea that 
marriage should be open to same-sex couples enters the mainstream.  My 
argument is, however, that because of the very different nature of the three 
rights in question, we cannot assume that the legal progress and changes in 
norms provided by stages one and two actually lead to same-sex marriage.  
These three rights are both distinct and autonomous from each other. 
Moreover, while there are surely arguments as to why sodomy laws should 
be sustained or why a sexual orientation category should not be added to 
antidiscrimination laws, these arguments are largely based on morality (or 
homophobia, or politics of disgust)243 and have the same basis as the “no promo 
homo” arguments.244  As such, these arguments are actually a modern version of 
 
 238. See JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 116-20 (2005). 
 239. See id. at 37-38. 
 240. See id.  
 241. A majority of Americans believe that sexual orientation should be protected under 
antidiscrimination laws.  See SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT 221 (2007) (reporting that 59 
percent of heterosexual American respondents indicated in a survey that they would favor a federal 
law prohibiting job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 242. But see ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 159 
(1995) (rejecting less radical and controversial elements of the gay rights movement, such as 
antidiscrimination laws, because they violate the public-private distinction, but arguing for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage). 
 243. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Many Americans 
do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as 
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home.  
They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be 
immoral and destructive.  The Court views it as ‘discrimination’ which it is the function of our 
judgments to deter.  So imbued is the Court with the law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, 
that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘mainstream’; that in 
most States what the Court calls ‘discrimination’ against those who engage in homosexual acts is 
perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such ‘discrimination’ under Title VII have repeatedly been 
rejected by Congress . . . .”). 
 244. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the 
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (2000) (“No promo homo” is  a 
phrase meaning “No promotion of homosexuality.”  No promo homo arguments have been spread 
in order to prevent “pro-gay” measures in law and norms, based on the belief that “gay people do 
disgusting things or are diseased or predatory.”). 
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old prejudices against homosexuality based on natural law and the immorality 
of LGB people, in addition to fears that they will infect others with their 
“problem” or “recruit” others.  According to these arguments, the state should 
not repeal sodomy laws or add sexual orientation as a protected category 
because the state should not promote immoral conduct that encourages the 
participation of others.245  The implication is that homosexuality and 
homosexual conduct are not as worthy as heterosexuality and heterosexual 
conduct.246  Some of these approaches may leave the Bible out of the argument, 
but they still cling to the perception that homosexuality is inherently immoral. 
In contrast, arguments against same-sex marriage sometimes encompass 
more than concealed bigotry and thus present real legal and societal 
challenges.247  For example, traditionalists emphasize the importance of 
marriage in encouraging people to procreate “responsibly.”248  They point out 
that children who live in “traditional” households enjoy a higher standard of 
living and better economic situation than children in “alternative” families, who 
are more likely to suffer from physical and emotional problems, abuse, etc. 249  
They aver that nontraditional families pose a danger to the social fabric because 
of the high rate of child poverty that they experience, the financial cost of 
divorce, and the high rate of teenage pregnancy and juvenile delinquency 
among children born outside marriage.  In this regard, traditionalists advocate 
preserving marriage’s special status as a framework for reproduction.  These 
arguments should be understood in light of the dramatic decline in the number 
of marriages in many places around the world.250  Some traditionalists perceive 
a relationship between changes in family structure and the recognition of same-
sex partnerships.  For example, Stanley Kurtz asserts that registered partnership 
laws in Nordic countries have caused a decrease in marriage rates and an 
increase in the number of people raising children out of wedlock.251  Kurtz 
argues that acceptance of same-sex marriage tells society that marriage itself is 
outdated, and that virtually any family form, including parenthood in the 
 
 245. Id. at 1329. 
 246. Id. at 1343. 
 247. There are a number of arguments against same-sex marriage, and I view many of them as 
flawed and ridiculous. 
 248. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State 
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771-814 (2001). 
 249. E.g., Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 377 
(2007). 
 250. See Pamela J. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: 
Demographic Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 L. & POL’Y 87 (2004) (In the United 
States, there are approximately five million cohabiting couples—the highest number in American 
history—yet they are entitled to only some of the legal safeguards available to married couples.); 
Erik Eckholm, Saying No to “I Do,” with the Economy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A15.  Cf. 
Godard, supra note 77, at 311 (In France in the 1970s, close to 400,000 marriages were celebrated each 
year; by 2006, this number fell to 274,400, a decline of 30 percent.  The decline has been accompanied 
by a rise in cohabitation and divorce.). 
 251. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 23, 2004, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/660zypwj.asp. 
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absence of marriage, is acceptable.252  These sorts of arguments are often driven 
by different political views rather than by the politics of disgust. 
Moreover, while people who vote against same-sex marriage in referenda 
may certainly be motivated by disgust or homophobia, when a state defends 
these arguments in courts, it must rely on non-homophobic, non-morality-based 
reasons for denying same-sex couples the right to marry.  As Justice Scalia 
observed in his Lawrence dissent, judges, unlike the general populace, need to 
extend principles to their logical end.253  Therefore, when arguments about 
responsible reproduction come before a court, judges can ascertain whether such 
arguments pass a rational basis test.  An example of the practical application of 
such a stance can be found in the New York Court of Appeals’ holding in 
Hernandez v. Robles that “[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the 
Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children 
will do best with a mother and father in the home . . . . In sum, there are rational 
grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of 
opposite sex.”254 
Thus people may oppose gay marriage for reasons arguably unrelated to 
homophobia or disgust, and judges can conclude that the legislature or the 
people in referenda had a legitimate reason to restrict marriage to opposite-sex 
 
 252. Of course, as Badgett points out, the decline in marriage rates started before the recognition 
of same-sex partnerships and can be attributed to many different factors.  BADGETT, supra note 182, at 
67-82.  Moreover, the assertion that marriage’s main purpose is to regulate reproduction is mistaken.  
As indicated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, procreation has never been the sole 
purpose of marriage—consider that sterile couples, as well as post-menopausal women, have never 
been prohibited from getting married.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 
(Mass. 2003) (“If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our statutes would draw 
a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of nonmarital child bearing and the creation of 
families by noncoital means.”). 
In addition, research has shown that there is no connection between the presence of two opposite-
sex parents and an optimal child-rearing environment.  Rather, various factors affect a child’s overall 
welfare: the child’s DNA; abilities; character; surroundings; peers, parents and other relatives; diet; 
the quality of the schools the child attends; the financial status of his or her family; and so on.  See 
Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 691 (2003) (reviewing two major reports regarding LGB parents, including one issued by 
the Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, and concluding that there are no meaningful differences between the children of LGB 
parents and those of heterosexuals parents); Michael J. Rosenfeld, Nontraditional Families and 
Childhood Progress Through School, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 755 (2010); Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual 
Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388-89 (2006) 
(presenting research that did not find any special psychological problems among the children of 
LGB parents); Brief of Amici Curiae, Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (No. 91-1394-05), 
available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/hawaii/baehr/1997/brief.doctors.of.sociology-
06.02.97. 
In fact, the most significant research on the welfare of the children of lesbians from conception 
through adolescence found that these children rated better than average in social skills, academics, 
and general competence and registered a significantly lower rate of social problems.  See Nanette 
Gartrell & Henny Bos, US National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-
Year-Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 28, 28 (2010). 
 253. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the benefits of 
leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike 
judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion.”). 
 254. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2006). 
Aloni_proof_022311 2/23/2011  12:48:26 PM 
148 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 18:105 2010 
couples only.  As such, it cannot be assumed that anyone who supports the 
decriminalization of sodomy or the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected 
category in antidiscrimination laws must also support same-sex marriage with 
the passage of time.  Eskridge himself acknowledges the differences between 
these rights: 
Moderate Americans willing to promote gay people from criminals to social 
misfits (like alcoholics) support sodomy decriminalization but not same-sex 
marriage.  Finally, the idea that marriage must be between one man and one 
woman is a core part of the belief systems and even the social identities of many 
Americans.255 
Indeed, the perceived uniqueness of marriage makes the battle for same-
sex marriage different from attempts to obtain other types of rights for LGB 
individuals or couples.  It is thus safe to say that recognition of same-sex 
marriage will never be seen as a small step, no matter what other milestones 
have already been achieved. 
VII. THE EFFECT OF CIVIL UNIONS ON THE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The most problematic assumption that the theory of small change makes is 
that civil unions are a temporary stage inevitably leading the way toward same-
sex marriage.  According to Waaldijk, the fact that registered partnership law 
was enacted in the Netherlands 
. . . did not silence the call for the opening up of marriage.  On the contrary, the 
social and political pressure increased.  In retrospect, it seems that the whole 
legislative process leading to the introduction of registered partnership and joint 
custody served to highlight the remaining discrimination caused by the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage: the awkward exceptions . . . and 
the separate and equal social status of registered partnership as compared to 
marriage.256 
Waaldijk adds that many same-sex couples choose not to register because 
of their commitment to same-sex marriage.257 
Merin makes a similar argument; even though he believes alternatives to 
marriage are based in a tradition of separate-but-equal and serve only to 
maintain compulsory heterosexuality as the dominant culture,258 he contends 
that civil unions are still a necessary step on the way to same-sex marriage, 
because only then will a state be ready, “in terms of its sociopolitical and legal 
climate,” to move to next stage.259  Conversely, Eskridge does not see civil 
unions as falling under the umbrella of separate-but-equal, because unlike the 
segregation of African Americans, the institution of civil unions seeks to 
 
 255. Eskridge, supra note 244 at 1349. 
 256. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 447. 
 257. Id. at 449 (“Anecdotal evidence suggested that many same-sex couples were not registering 
their partnerships, because they preferred to wait for real marriage.”). 
 258. MERIN, supra note 5, at 304 (“Separate ‘marriage-like’ institutions only serve to perpetuate 
homophobia, heterosexual superiority, and gender binarism.”). 
 259. Id. at 326-27. 
Aloni_proof_022311 2/23/2011  12:48:26 PM 
 THE POSSIBILITY OF PREDICTING LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 149 
advance liberal values, while segregation was part of an apartheid regime.260  
According to Eskridge, civil unions are actually a kind of “equality practice,” 
inter alia, because they are a necessary temporary stage on the way to same-sex 
marriage. 
The theory of small change is based on a number of premises.  First, civil 
unions bring to the forefront the differences between opposite- and same-sex 
couples, because the public and the legislature cannot see a good reason to 
maintain such an unequal status.  Consequently, civil unions encourage the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  Second, the theory of small change assumes 
that civil unions are a necessary stage before same-sex marriage, because 
without it, the public is unprepared for same-sex marriage.  Third, the theory of 
small change hypothesizes that the final frontier of LGB activism is the 
legalization of same-sex marriage and that LGB people and organizations are 
united in their desire to achieve the legalization of same-sex marriage.  In other 
words, by situating marriage as the final goal, the theory of small change not 
only describes or evaluates the path to same-sex marriage but rather advances 
an ideal—that same-sex marriage is indeed the final and ultimate goal of the 
LGB movement.  These assumptions, however, are not well founded.  While the 
introduction of civil unions could, in theory, serve to highlight the differences 
and disparities between marriage and unions, in most cases it actually blurs the 
lines between the two, potentially leading to the general public’s view that civil 
unions are a fair compromise.  Furthermore, the LGB community has less of an 
incentive to fight for same-sex marriage once its members enjoy all or most of 
the rights that are associated with marriage.  Most importantly, it appears that in 
European countries, because of the declining value of marriage and the stigma 
that it often carries, some LGB organizations are not overly eager to legalize 
same-sex marriage. 
A. Does the Institution of Civil Unions Really Highlight the Differences? 
Marriage is a legal institution with substantial economic underpinnings.  It 
entails many benefits, including tax and property benefits, health insurance, and 
citizenship.261  The same is true with regard to civil unions.  In European 
countries, civil unions provide most, and sometimes all, of the economic benefits 
for which opposite-sex married couples are eligible.  In the United States, in 
states that offer civil unions or expansive rights and benefits to domestic 
partners (and those that allow same-sex marriage), all the benefits provided to 
married couples by the state are conferred upon same-sex couples; yet this does 
not include federal benefits, which are substantial.262 
 
 260. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 144. 
 261. See COTT, supra note 214, at 1-5 (describing the development of the connection between the 
state interest in marriage and the benefits that followed or were denied). 
 262. Since DOMA defines marriage as a “legal union between one man and one woman,” most 
benefits that are provided to married couples are denied to same-sex couples.  This is an important 
distinction that the current theories do not succeed in addressing: in a country where civil unions 
offer all the rights associated with marriage (as in the European context), the distinction between 
marriage and civil unions is less pronounced.  In the United States, however, both civil unions and 
same-sex marriage deny same-sex couples many rights from the federal government; thus the 
pressure on resolving these inequalities is stronger, and it seems fruitless to compare the two. 
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Many scholars share the belief that individuals have an incentive to marry 
because it is an efficient institution.263  It provides economic benefits and is a 
public good; the more marriage is associated with such benefits, the more 
individuals seeking to improve their economic situation will desire marriage.  
Therefore, “[i]ndividual same-sex couples, especially those with property or 
children, would have the same economic incentives as different-sex couples to 
desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in addition to any 
other customary benefits of being married.”264  Economic analysis regards both 
marriage and cohabitation (and thus civil unions) as the result of rational 
behavior when individuals seek financial, as well as physical and emotional, 
benefits.265 
If civil unions provide all the benefits associated with marriage, it stands to 
reason that the LGB community will have less incentive to fight for same-sex 
marriage.  Not surprisingly, the economic benefits accrued by marriage have 
consistently been one of the main engines of the battle for same-sex marriage.  
For example, among first-world countries, one of the main factors motivating 
the fight for same-sex marriage was the AIDS crisis.266  The AIDS crisis made 
clear to same-sex couples how vulnerable their relationships are, often with 
respect to the rights and benefits that they were denied.  Gay men were required 
to pay inheritance taxes on their partners’ apartments after they passed away, 
were not eligible for their partners’ health insurance, could not take advantage 
of rent control when their partners passed away when the lease was in the 
latter’s name, and had no standing regarding property inheritance.  These are 
strong economic and efficiency incentives to vigorously fight for the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships.  Importantly, these problems initiated a 
number of legal actions with the goal of granting such benefits to individuals in 
same-sex partnerships.267  When such issues no longer exist (for example, if LGB 
couples in civil union regimes have full rights in this respect), however, 
complacency within the LGB community sets in. 
It may be argued that discrimination against same-sex couples results in 
emotional damage that has corollary economic consequences as well.  
Ultimately, the treatment of same-sex couples as second-class citizens should 
constitute a strong enough incentive for LGB people to continue investing in the 
battle for same-sex marriage.  Misha Isaak, for example, argues that even if civil 
unions provide full economic benefits: 
 
 263. See, e.g., Badgett, supra note 8, at 76 (“Economists from many traditions argue that the legal 
institution of marriage promotes efficiency at the social level and at the family level by promoting 
the specialization of labor within the household. . .”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Antony W. Dnes, Cohabitation and Marriage, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE 118, 120 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002). 
 266. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 96-104; FRÉDÉRIC MARTEL, THE PINK AND THE BLACK: 
HOMOSEXUALS IN FRANCE SINCE 1968, 208-15 (1999) (describing a similar effect in France, with a 
much later response, and the “import” of ACT-UP Paris); Rydström, supra note 64, at 203-05 
(describing the effect of the AIDS crisis on the struggle for recognition of same-sex relationships in 
Scandinavia). 
 267. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 102-3 (describing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E. 
2d 49 (1989)). 
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[T]hey fail to provide marriage’s intangible benefits, such as esteem, self-
definition, and the stabilizing influence of social expectations.  Although these 
benefits may be less concrete than, say, tax exemptions, they are no less 
constitutionally significant.268 
Even assuming that Isaak is correct that civil unions do not offer the same 
emotional rewards that marriage does (though some people reject that 
assertion),269 the emotional aspect is a far less substantial rallying cry than the 
viable benefits and rights at stake.  When LGB couples have the same economic 
benefits and rights as opposite-sex couples, they have less incentive to fight for 
marriage.  Additionally, courts and legislatures have less of an impetus to push 
for same-sex marriage as there is less of an identifiable harm or damage.  In 
other words, it is much simpler to argue for equality in benefits and protection 
than in terms of emotional equality.  The main weakness in Isaak’s argument is 
his failure to take into consideration the decline in the value of marriage in 
many places around the world.270  For many, marriage is not tied to self-
definition.271  Many are able to find “self-definition” through civil unions and 
cohabitation. 
Badgett’s study suggests that in countries where the value of marriage has 
declined, the chances of achieving legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
are higher.272  Thus, civil unions usually take place in countries where marriage 
is less meaningful on a societal level.  A large number of cohabiting unmarried 
opposite-sex couples has proved to demonstrate the declining material 
importance of marriage in a particular state or country.273  In such places, same-
sex couples who achieved all the benefits offered by marriage are probably less 
passionate about the fight for same-sex marriage and marriage is probably not 
tightly linked to self-esteem and identity. 
For example, France has an exceptionally high number of cohabiting 
opposite-sex couples, which, as mentioned previously, is a strong indicator of 
the declining value of marriage.274  In 2006 the PaCS was amended to provide 
almost all the economic rights accompanying marriage; same-sex couples now 
enjoy many of the same benefits as their straight counterparts.  Even though the 
 
 268. Misha Isaak, Comment, “What’s in a Name?” Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significant of 
“Marriage,” 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 607, 612 (2008). 
 269. See, e.g., Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 
19-20 (2000) (arguing that civil unions are a worthy alternative to marriage). 
 270. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 254 (1989) (“Declining marriage rates in all the 
industrial countries are witness not only to a general postponement of marriage, but also to a certain 
shift away from formal unions.”). 
 271. See generally Clare Chambers, Feminism, Liberalism and Marriage (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Feminism,%20Liberalism 
%20and%20Marriage.doc (“Feminists should support the abolition of state-recognised marriage.”). 
 272. See Badgett, supra note 8, at 77. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 208, at  20 n.12 (In 2002, fourteen percent of people living as 
couples in France were cohabiting – the highest percentage of thirty countries studied.); see also ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COHABITATION RATE AND PREVALENCE OF OTHER FORMS OF 
PARTNERSHIP, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/27/41920080.pdf (Of French adults 
between twenty and thirty-four years of age, 21.8 percent were cohabitating.). 
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PaCS was created mainly for same-sex couples, it seems to be more popular 
among opposite-sex couples275 who often choose the PaCS over marriage.276  For 
every two marriages in France, a PaCS is celebrated, totaling half a million 
PaCSed couples in 2009, a number that is rising steadily.277  It is likely that in 
such circumstances, LGB individuals feel less discriminated against and have 
less motivation to fight for same-sex marriage. 
This is not to say that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is harmless.  
Some critics argue that civil unions are damaging to children raised by parents 
in same-sex relationships because the children see society treating their parents 
as second-class citizens.  A more palpable grievance recognized by the 
California Supreme Court is the exposure same-sex couples may experience 
every time they identify themselves as part of a civil union (in places where such 
unions are open only to same-sex couples) rather than as married.278  Despite 
being possibly offensive and a violation of privacy, such potential injury is not 
perceived as a severe grievance compared to, for example, denial of the right to 
visit a loved one in hospital or to make important medical decisions for one’s 
partner when he or she is unconscious.  Moreover, as the trend of opening civil 
unions to opposite-sex couples continues, the privacy injury will be diminished. 
Another way civil unions potentially impede the path to same-sex marriage 
involves general public opinion.  In essence, when LGB couples receive full 
rights, it is no longer a question of whether same-sex couples deserve 
recognition, but what type of legal recognition they deserve.  It goes without 
saying that the more support the general public has for same-sex marriage, the 
more likely it is that same-sex marriage will be codified into law.  However, 
surveys show that the majority of the public prefers civil unions to same-sex 
marriages.279 
 
 275. See, e.g., Patrick Festy, The “Civil Solidarity Pact” (PACS) in France: An Impossible Evaluation, 
POPULATION & SOCIÉTÉS (Institut National D’études Démographiques, Paris, Fr.), June, 2001, available 
at http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_publication/697/publi_pdf2_pop_and_soc_english_369.pdf (French law 
prohibits the collection of statistical records on the type of PaCS, but estimates are published 
frequently.) 
 276. Godard, supra note 77, at 313-14 (“It is becoming an increasingly popular option . . . it seems, 
in fact, to be more popular with heterosexuals.”). 
 277. Edward Cody, Straight Couples in France Are Choosing Civil Unions Meant for Gays, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/ 
AR2009021303365.html. 
 278. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008)  (“[O]ne consequence of the coexistence of 
two parallel types of familial relationships is that—in the numerous everyday social, employment, 
and governmental settings in which an individual is asked whether he or she ‘is married or single’—
an individual who is a domestic partner and who accurately responds to the question by disclosing 
that status will (as a realistic matter) be disclosing his or her homosexual orientation, even if he or 
she would rather not do so under the circumstances and even if that information is totally irrelevant 
in the setting in question.”).  
 279. See Brewer & Wilcox, supra note 217, at 602 (“Public support for civil unions . . . appears to 
be substantially greater than public support for same-sex marriage . . . . This finding stands out most 
clearly in the nine (three Gallup, two ABC News/Washington Post, four Pew, and one Quinnipiac) 
polls that included questions about both same-sex marriage and civil unions: in these polls, the 
percentage supporting civil unions exceeded the percentage supporting same-sex marriage by at 
least 3 percentage points and by as much as 19 percentage points . . . . The average difference was 14 
percentage points.”); Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage, but Support for Civil Unions Continues to Rise, 
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The public is more likely to understand the need for change, and therefore 
show more support for same-sex marriage, if they are exposed to the stories of 
discrimination faced by real LGB people—in essence, stories that foster empathy 
for the “underdog.”280  Since the beginning of the public debate over same-sex 
marriage, stories of the consequences of discrimination against LGB couples 
have often been the most efficient means of convincing the public of the need to 
extend the institution of marriage to same-sex couples.281  Matthew Coles, 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
Transgender & AIDS Project, has written recently about the reasons why he 
believes California’s Proposition 8 succeeded, and the steps that should be taken 
in order to prevent future losses of this kind.  At the center of his analysis, he 
suggests “people have to hear about discrimination from a personal perspective, 
not as an abstract principle.”282  Indeed, the main criticism of California’s LGB 
organizations is that they did not effectively publicize the pain caused by the 
denial of rights to same-sex couples.283 
The rights offered by civil unions make the current form of discrimination 
more abstract and mundane, as they seem to address and resolve the very issues 
that gave such shock value and emotional punch to these stories.284  Stories like 
that of Sharon Kowalski and her life partner, Karen Thompson285—a story that 
 
PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 9, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1375/gay-marriage-civil-unions-
opinion. 
 280. Gandhi was very cognizant of the fact that certain incremental improvements in the laws 
toward Indians in South Africa and India would blunt the truth of the perception of injustice among 
Afrikaners and the British.  Therefore, he was very careful to push for certain changes in the law and 
not others.  See LOUIS FISCHER, GANDHI: HIS LIFE AND MESSAGE FOR THE WORLD 62 (1982) (“Ready to 
die for principle, [Gandhi] preferred to compromise and arbitrate.  He wished to collaborate with the 
British and hoped that the twentieth century would vanquish the ancient dinosaur.  But when 
Dominion status [of India] was shelved, when instead repressive wartime measures were confirmed,  
the Mahatma took his first deliberate action against British imperialism in India.”) 
 281. See e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 96-104 (anecdotes about gay relationships lacking legal 
standing, in the context of the AIDS crisis), 111-19 (the story of Sharon Kowalski). 
 282. Matthew Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271.html. 
 283. See Louis Weisberg, Prop 8, What Went Wrong, 365 GAY (Nov. 25, 2008), http:// 
www.365gay.com/living/prop-8-what-went-wrong/3 (“Renna and other critics say what was 
fatally missing from the No on 8 campaign’s advertising was the presence of actual gay and lesbian 
families telling their stories.  By holding back on the emotional punch and choosing instead to focus 
on cold principles, they say the campaign failed to move people on the opposing side.”). 
 284. That was the response of the British House of Lords in the same-sex marriage case Wilkinson 
v. Kitzinger.  [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2022, [75] (Eng.) (“I propose to adopt that broader approach by 
treating the matter on the basis that, although Parliament had no positive obligation under the 
Convention to take steps to redress the perceived social disadvantages experienced by same-sex 
partners as compared with married persons, by embarking on legislation designed to alleviate such 
social disadvantage and passing the measures contained in the CPA [Civil Partnership Act] which 
provided for recognition and treatment of a foreign marriage as a civil partnership only, brought the 
facts of the Petitioner's situation within the ambit of Article 12.”) 
 285. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 112-14 (In 1983, Sharon Kowalski and her life partner, 
Karen Thompson, were leading closeted lesbian lives.  Neither woman had told her parents about 
the relationship.  Thompson was a teacher and feared she would be fired if her sexual orientation 
became known.  The two women owned a house jointly and had lived together in a committed 
relationship for more than nine years.  On her way home from work, Kowalski was severely injured 
in an automobile accident.  The hospital to which she was admitted denied her life partner 
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“brought the vulnerability of lesbian and gay couples home to everyone”286—are 
no longer as common in a civil unions regime. 
Two referenda in Arizona provide an example of how the enactment of 
civil unions can hamper achievement of the same-sex marriage goal.  In 2006, 
Arizona became the first U.S. state to reject a ballot initiative aimed at 
preventing the state from “creat[ing] or recogniz[ing] a legal status for 
unmarried persons that is similar to marriage.”287  Voters rejected this initiative 
by a slim majority of 51.8 percent.  In 2008, another referendum was presented, 
though this time opponents of same-sex marriage “decided to push for a simple, 
straightforward amendment that would enshrine the traditional definition of 
marriage without touching the domestic partnership issues.”288  In other words, 
whereas the first initiative utilized expansive, broad language to deny any kind 
of recognition to same-sex couples, the second referendum precluded only the 
possibility of recognizing same-sex marriage.  Not surprisingly, a majority (56 
percent) voted in favor of the second referendum.  There were several 
explanations for this “flip.”  Undoubtedly, the most influential factor was the 
fact that the second referendum was not aimed at excluding the legal 
recognition and rights of same-sex couples, but only at excluding the right of 
same-sex couples to marry.  The public is more likely to protect same-sex 
couples when they are being denied most rights or recognition, not when they 
are affirmatively seeking the ability to marry.  In conclusion, the public may 
view civil unions as a fair compromise, reasoning that even if they result in 
some form of abstract discrimination, civil unions are a just solution.289 
Choice set theory argues that public opinion becomes more systematic and 
“rational” when citizens are forced to respond to a clearly binary “choice set”: 
yes or no, black or white.290  Without such binary oppositions, citizens cannot 
make good decisions because there is too much information, a lack of 
information, or simply too many choices.  Civil unions have created a new 
 
notification, information, and visitation rights, and because of the extent of her injuries, she was 
unable to communicate her own preferences.  When Kowalski’s parents arrived, they intensified the 
exclusion of Thompson from Kowalski’s life.  The parents denied that their daughter was a lesbian 
and suggested that if Thompson were allowed to see Kowalski, she would sexually molest her.  The 
father eventually became the court-appointed guardian and permanently enforced the separation.  
Kowalski and Thompson became the public faces of the battle for the rights of marriage, and for 
several years, gay pride parades were led by wheelchairs.). 
 286. Id. at 111. 
 287. ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE (2006), available at http:// 
www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop107.pdf. 
 288. Kevin Vance, Why Arizona Flipped On Gay Marriage, CBS NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008),   
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/02/opinion/main4643975.shtml. 
 289. The feeling that civil unions are not a very discriminatory regime may be reinforced by the 
argument that marriage should be safeguarded as a religious institution and that civil unions are a 
suitable secular alternative.  See Alan M. Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, Government Should Quit the 
Marriage Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at B15;  Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry, 98 CAL. L. 
REV. 667, 695 (2010) (“I personally favor the solution of leaving civil unions to the state and leaving 
marriage to religions and other private entities.”). 
 290. See Kenneth Cimino & Gary Segura, From Radical to Conservative: The Political 
Construction of Civil Unions and Changing Public Attitudes (paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Sep. 1, 2005),  available at http:// 
www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/1/5/4/p41545_index.html. 
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situation in social science theory, a unique structure that does not fit choice set 
theory.291  The option of civil unions offers an intermediate step and thus a 
“trichotomous” choice set, forcing the public to choose from among three 
options (i.e., no legal recognition for same-sex couples, civil unions, or same-sex 
marriage).  It has been suggested that the presence of the third alternative might 
reduce the willingness of some moderates to go as far as supporting same-sex 
marriage as the option of civil unions provides a safe compromise.292  In 
addition, opponents of same-sex marriage might believe that civil unions could 
undermine the momentum of the struggle for same-sex marriage293 and thus 
support the establishment of civil unions as a means of preventing the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  These two possibilities strongly support the 
notion that civil unions can have paralyzing effects on the path to same-sex 
marriage. 
B. Is Marriage Really the Final Frontier of European LGB Organizations?  (Why 
Marriage Is Not Everything) 
The theory of small change does not just tell us that civil unions are a 
temporary stage that facilitates progress toward same-sex marriage; by 
neglecting to take into consideration the lack of enthusiasm for the legalization 
of same-sex marriage among many LGB communities in Europe, it also situates 
marriage as the final stage without examining whether this is indeed the case.  
In doing so, it goes beyond its claims to explain the past and predict the future 
by cementing the notion that marriage is the final and most important stage in 
Europe, and that the United States just needs to follow the same path.  The 
picture is far from accurate.  If there is an important lesson for the United States, 
it is that marriage is not everything. 
The incrementalist account of same-sex marriage legalization is manifestly 
teleological—it presents marriage as the end, both literal and normative, of the 
LGB movement.  Behind this kind of thinking is, in part, the belief that nothing 
signals approval of homosexuality more than same-sex marriage.294  This is 
apparent from Eskridge’s description of his vision of social acceptance of LGB 
people: acceptance becomes greater and more widespread as more legal 
progress is made, until its final end—marriage—is obtained.295  This is clearly 
wrong or at least varies from person to person, and from culture to culture.  For 
example, the French believe that adoption by same-sex couples signals approval 
of homosexuality (or at least genuine indifference to it) more than the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, since adoption supposedly involves questions 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at *23 (“As the debate endures, it is likely, we think, that this alternative will continue to 
draw greater and greater interest from the middle of the American political spectrum.”). 
 293. Id. 
 294. See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY 
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 206 (1996) (arguing that gay males should get married in order to become 
sexually civilized). 
 295. SULLIVAN, supra note 242, at 180-85 (1995) (predicting and hoping that the gay movement 
can pack up and go home once marriage is attained). 
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concerning the sexual formation of children.296  In other words, there is a 
normative commitment that informs Eskridge’s and others’ notion of progress: 
the idea that marriage is the final goal of LGB activism.  But this vision of 
marriage as the final frontier is not representative of the goals of the LGB 
community in Europe.  In fact, the evidence demonstrates that many Europeans 
are most interested in securing partnership rights and not marriage. 
It is striking, especially from an American perspective, to recall that one of 
Great Britain’s largest and most influential LGB organizations, Stonewall, does 
not advocate the goal of same-sex marriage.  In fact, the organization advances 
the idea “that Civil Partnership [i]s preferable to marriage because it should be 
seen as a twenty-first century means of recognising modern relationships and 
that this [i]s preferable to attempting to radicalize the traditional notion of 
marriage.”297  In outlining its key priorities, the organization does not currently 
use the word “marriage.”298  Nicola Barker argues that organizations 
representing the LGB community have generally welcomed the Civil 
Partnership Act in England.299  Criticism has been largely confined to 
substantive rather than ideological issues; but the fact that civil partnership is 
nominally different from marriage has not been of particular concern to the LGB 
organizations. 
Similarly, the websites of some of the important LGB organizations in 
Germany, England, and France do not advocate same-sex marriage.  LSVD (the 
Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany), one of Germany’s largest LGB 
organizations, is proud of the achievement of the Lifetime Partnerships and 
regularly works for the improvement of the benefits accompanying it.  Its 
website states: 
Only ten years after our foundation we were successful in obtaining a registered 
partnership law in Germany.  This means that we convinced the German 
Parliament and society that equal rights for gay and lesbian couples are 
necessary for a modern, democratic society.  Nevertheless, we still have to 
struggle for equal rights in areas like taxation and pension laws, adoption and 
child custody.300 
The focus on rights rather than marriage should come as no surprise.  
Germany, like some other European countries, has experienced an increasing 
number of cohabiting couples, a high number of divorces, and the flourishing of 
 
 296. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 208, at 137-42.  Cf. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 728 (“A review of the 
European experience reveals one dominant pattern.  Partnership rights for gay and lesbian couples 
reflect a willingness to confer economic and social benefits on gay men and lesbians.  Concomitantly, 
disapproval, or at least, skepticism, concerning gay and lesbian parenting has resulted in explicit 
denial of joint adoption rights and/or denial of access to donor insemination services.”). 
 297. Shipman & Smart, supra note 97, at ¶ 2.5. 
 298. STONEWALL, www.stonewall.org.uk/about_us (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 299. Nicola Barker, “Gay Marriage”: Civil Partnerships for Same-Sex Couples in the United 
Kingdom (paper presented at the annual meeting of The Law and Society Association, May 27, 
2004). 
 300. LSVD: THE LESBIAN & GAY FED’N IN GER., http://typo3.lsvd.de/229.0.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2010). 
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alternative families.301  What is unique about Germany is that it has a strong 
pluralistic view and there is no panic with regard to the consequences of such 
changes on the family structure.302  In this atmosphere, it is no wonder that 
many LGB people seek not marriage but equal rights. 
Moreover, data shows that in European countries that have legalized same-
sex marriage or offer registered partnership schemes, the number of same-sex 
couples who married or registered is significantly lower compared to both the 
number of same-sex couples residing in the country and the number of 
opposite-sex couples who have registered or married.303  While there are a 
number of contradicting explanations for this phenomenon,304 it no doubt 
testifies to the lack of enthusiasm demonstrated by LGB Europeans toward 
marriage or other marriage-like institutions.305  In essence and in practice, LGB 
Europeans choose to enjoy legal recognition, but less frequently institutionalize 
their relationships. 
Conversely, American LGB couples are much more likely to register or 
marry than their European counterparts and have more interest than their 
European counterparts in securing marriage rights.306  In American 
organizations same-sex marriage has “emerged as the highest of priorities in the 
gay community”307 and is an issue to which the general public devotes a fair 
amount of attention.308  Another indication of the single-minded focus on same-
sex marriage in the United States is demonstrated by the amount of spending on 
campaigns and advocacy in this area.  Opponents of Proposition 8, for example, 
invested more than thirty-one million dollars on this mission.309  One of the first 
items appearing on the website of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
 
 301. See Ilona Ostner, Cohabitation in Germany—Rules, Reality and Public Discourses, 15 INT’L J. L., 
POL’Y & FAM. 88, 89 (2001). 
 302. Id. at 88-89 (“Germany is also a peculiar case: divorce and lone parenthood do not create 
stigma”). 
 303. Patrick Festy, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe, 61 POPULATION 1, 53-55, 71-88 
(2006), available at http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=POPE&ID_NUMPUBLIE=POPE_ 
604&ID_ARTICLE=POPE_604_0417&REDIR=1; see also BADGETT, supra note 182, at 45 (“[T]he 
number of couples registering as partners seemed surprisingly low.”). 
 304. Do Homosexuals Really Want to Get Married?, CROSSWALK, http://www.crosswalk.com/ 
1410340/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (suggesting that LGB people do not want to get married).  But see 
BADGETT, supra note 182, at 46-56 (suggesting that over the time LGB people will get married in 
greater numbers). 
 305. Cohabitating LGB people in those states enjoy a large number of legal rights and do not 
need to marry or register. 
 306. BADGETT, supra note 182, at 54 (“When given the opportunity, same-sex couples in the 
United States appear to be much more likely to marry or register than do those in Europe.”). 
 307. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 237 
(2006). 
 308. Id. at 236 (“In a very short period of time, this issue has moved to the center of the gay and 
lesbian rights movement as well as larger mainstream political and legal debates.”). 
 309. Dan Morain & Jessica Garrison, Prop. 8 Foes, Fans Amass $60 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/25/local/me-marriagemoney25; see also Pro-Marriage 
Equality Groups Spent Big in Vermont, Got Big Results, LEZGETREAL (July, 2009), http:// 
lezgetreal.com/2009/07/pro-marriage-equality-groups-spent-big-in-vermont-got-big-results (“Of 
the groups supporting marriage equality, Vermont Freedom To Marry spent the most money.  Their 
entire amount came to just under $300,000.”). 
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Fund, the oldest and largest LGB organization in the country, for example, is the 
New Jersey Civil Union Watch, the mission of which is “work[ing] toward the 
goal of marriage equality.”310  Unlike its European counterparts, Lambda Legal 
regularly works toward both civil unions and marriages, though it sees marriage 
as the ultimate goal. 
Normatively, there are good reasons for working on securing partnership 
rights rather than focusing solely on same-sex marriage, or positing marriage as 
the final goal of the LGB movement.  Marriage does not offer relief from 
discrimination against LGB individuals who do not seek or live in marriage-like 
arrangements.  Moreover, LGB people who do not live in marriage-like 
relationships will be subjected to additional discrimination if the married-
versus-unmarried distinction gains cultural value.311  Likewise, legalization of 
same-sex marriage may validate those couples who fit in best with straight 
culture and implicitly penalize those who are not married, thus privileging to an 
even greater extent already normative authorizations.  Marriage wages an attack 
on sexual LGB culture in its failing attempt to create “good gays” and reinforces 
the hierarchy of sexual shame by delegitimizing otherwise potentially fulfilling 
non-monogamous sexual lives.312  There is cause for additional concern when a 
group finally wins its rights: the group often creates new hierarchies that mirror 
those of the dominant culture.313  In this way, some group members become 
second-class citizens if they do not adopt the behavior of the dominant 
culture.314 
Similarly, legalization of same-sex marriage may exert pressure on people 
to get married and may limit the options for couplehood.  In fact, it is argued 
that same-sex marriage will narrow, perhaps irretrievably, the scope of future 
possibilities for intimate life and the family for LGB people.315  For example, 
same-sex marriage does not provide for the recognition of other forms of 
kinship that are not currently recognized by the law, such as the complex kin 
relations between close friends that are common in San Francisco.316 
 
 310. Marriage, Relationships, and Family Law, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-
work/issues/marriage-relationships-family/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 311. See generally Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of 
Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 97. 
 312. See, e,g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE (2000). 
 313. See Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 
229, 241 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 314. We can read the normalization of same-sex marriage by looking at the leading counsel in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the case challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 in federal court.  
Lead counsel and the person who initiated the lawsuit is Theodore Olson, who served as solicitor 
general under President George W. Bush.  He joined the fight for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage because he “believe[s] that a conservative value is stable relationships and stable 
community and loving individuals coming together and forming a basis that is a building block of 
our society, which includes marriage.”  FoxNews Sunday: Ted Olson: Same-Sex Marriage is a 
Conservative Value (FoxNews television broadcast Aug. 8, 2010), available at 
http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/node/38878. 
 315. See Franke, supra note 307, at 240. 
 316. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1997). 
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Some feminist scholars view marriage as a harmful institution and thus 
urge the LGB community not to pursue it.  Philosopher Clare Chambers 
suggests, based on a review of numerous feminist accounts of marriage, that 
marriage’s practical effects on women make them worse off317 because marriage 
reinforces the gendered division of labor and thus women earn less than men 
and are less independent.  Marriage also reinforces the notion that housework is 
primarily the domain of women, even if they work outside the home.318  Yet 
there are pressures for women to get married, and women are commonly seen 
as flawed and unsuccessful if they are not married.319  Therefore, Chambers 
concludes that “both women and gay men are better off, and justice is served, if 
marriage ceases to exist as an institution.”320 
In conclusion, it seems that the theory of small change offers an inaccurate 
map of the process to same-sex marriage.  Although a variety of opinions exists 
among European LGB people,321 and steps have been taken to legalize same-sex 
marriage in several European countries, it appears that LGB individuals and 
organizations are not united in their views concerning same-sex marriage and 
that the overall level of investment in legalizing same-sex marriage is very 
different in Europe.  In light of the strong arguments against making marriage 
the ultimate goal of the LGB movement, the European LGB community’s 
 
 317. See generally Chambers, supra note 271. 
 318. Id. at *3 (“[A]s Claudia Card insists, it would be wrong to think that practical harms have 
ceased as laws have changed: the progress embodied in the criminalization of marital rape and 
violence, she writes, ‘has been mostly on paper.  Wives continue to die daily at a dizzying rate.’”). 
 319. Id. at *5 (“One particularly pernicious form of symbolic violence that marriage enacts on 
women in contemporary western societies is the sense that they are flawed and failing if unmarried.  
This perception may be encouraged by pressure from peers, family, news reports, novels, television, 
film and self-help books.  Research shows that many heterosexual women see single life as a 
temporary phase preceding marriage, and that being single for longer or when older is construed as 
sad and shameful, and at least partially the fault of the single woman herself.”). 
 320. Id. at 10. 
 321. It seems that debate over this issue within the LGB movement could result in controversy 
causing divisions within the community and resulting in a weaker movement.  The question is to 
what extent, if at all, such debate impedes the activity of LGB organizations.  The experience of other 
social movements teaches that fragmentation within a movement may preclude it from achieving its 
goals.  David S. Meyer, Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity 
and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement, 8 SOC. F. 157, 158 (1993) (suggesting, based on the 
experience of the nuclear freeze movement, that fragmentation may have an adverse effect on social 
movements); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 129-43 (suggesting that disputes 
within the feminist movement of the second wave, especially between radical and non-radical 
feminists, and the controversy about the role of lesbians within the movement  tore “apart, slowly 
but surely, the reticulate interstices of the movement.  The segmented groups were becoming 
fragmented groups; increasing in number and decreasing in communication.”). 
Such fracturing may have even more serious effects when the movement is becoming 
institutionalized, i.e., when it is working within the mainstream and abiding by the rules.  Meyer, 
supra, at 175-76.  However, researchers of social movements also suggest that divisions may have 
positive effects: they can facilitate the development of new ideas and can allow movements to 
accommodate people with conflicting ideas.  FREEMAN, supra, at 127 (“Its segmentary nature also 
encourages proliferation, adaptation, and responsiveness to its environment.”).  I do not think that 
such conflicts are a very significant factor in the LGB struggle for same-sex marriage, but only wish 
to demonstrate that, along with other factors impeding efforts to achieve legal recognition of same-
sex marriage, the establishment of civil unions may have an overall paralyzing effect. 
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restraint in its efforts to secure the right to marry, and its commitment to secure 
rights, offers a valuable lesson. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
To date, the notion that the recognition of same-sex marriage can be 
predicted on the basis of the experiences of different countries has not been 
challenged.  On the contrary, there is general acceptance of the theory of small 
change within the scholarly community.  Yet a brief survey of events casts more 
than a little doubt on the accepted theory.  The only significant attempt to 
challenge this theory, Badgett’s empirical method, seems to fall into a similar 
pattern of generalization.  It appears that the attempt to generalize the 
experience of arriving at legal recognition of same-sex marriage not only misses 
key components in the equation but also makes faulty assumptions.  This article 
proposes that overall, the theory of small change and the empirical method 
described by Badgett are not reliable ways of predicting the legalization of 
same-sex marriage and are not capable of explaining in a satisfying fashion the 
legal and societal process that have led to the legalization of same-sex marriage 
in some European countries. 
More troubling is the suggestion that the process of achieving legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage can be definable, as this can lead to 
complacency within the LGB rights movement.  After all, if it is believed that 
one factor predicts another, it is easy to accept it as an unfortunate stage 
necessary to reach an ultimate goal.  Once we recognize that no such factor 
inevitably leads to that goal, we must accept that no stage prior to the 
acceptance of same-sex marriage should be taken as a harbinger of the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. 
The effect of civil unions in Europe is not completely clear at this point.  
However, it is apparent that it is not a springboard to the next stage but rather a 
legal institution with a number of important implications.  In the United States 
the effects are far from obvious.  Therefore, the LGB community and its 
supporters should not take anything for granted; instead, they must challenge 
any commonly held assumptions regarding the path leading to legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage.  This discussion is relevant not only on a scholarly level 
but also on a practical one.  For example, based on a rationale similar to that 
offered by the incremental approach, LGB organizations objected to turning to 
the federal court in the case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger.322  However, if we 
understand that nothing is really predictable or obvious, a move to the federal 
court becomes more acceptable.  In other words, if the incremental approach is 
dispensible, and its progress can be slow, perhaps the time has come for a more 
aggressive approach—at the federal level.  Ultimately, an even better idea 
would be to leave behind the struggle for same-sex marriage and focus attention 
 
 322. E.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 
2009, at A1 (“‘We think its [sic] risky and premature,’ said Jennifer C. Pizer, marriage project director 
for Lambda Legal in Los Angeles, adding that a loss at the Supreme Court level could take decades 
to undo.”). 
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on a broader change—the opening of an alternative to marriage for both 
opposite- and same-sex couples. 
Furthermore, because the theory of small change assumes a chronological 
process and presumes the end goal to be marriage, the stages of the incremental 
process validate a particular course of action and undermine actions that seek to 
achieve each right for its own sake.  For example, the model delegitimizes 
attempts to win hospital visitation rights for same-sex couples that do not have 
marriage as their end goal or the right of individuals in same-sex relationships 
to exemptions from the inheritance tax in the case of partner’s death, because it 
asserts that marriage and the bundle of rights that it offers will satisfy all the 
needs of LGB people.  By viewing marriage as the final frontier, the theory of 
small change also posits marriage—a stage that symbolizes the normalization of 
LGB people—as the most important and final goal of the LGB movement.  The 
European experience tells a more complex story if we are willing to take a closer 
look at it.  Many European LGB organizations object to or simply are not very 
enthusiastic about working toward legal recognition of same-sex marriage and 
are more interested in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples.  Thus, 
future research needs to look at the creation of marriage alternatives as “equality 
practice,” not in the sense that Eskridge advocates but rather in the sense of 
creating other legal institutions (not just marriage by a different name) that treat 
opposite- and same-sex couples equally. 
 
